faith,” is that “slavery still continues in those states,”—­thus admitting, that if slavery did not “still continue” in those States, Congress could abolish it in the District.  The same admission is made also in the premises, which state that slavery existed in those states at the time of the cession, &c.  Admitting that if it had not existed there then, but had grown up in the District under United States’ laws, Congress might constitutionally abolish it.  Or that if the ceded parts of those states had been the only parts in which slaves were held under their laws, Congress might have abolished in such a contingency also.  The cession in that case leaving no slaves in those states,—­no “good faith” would be “implied” in it, nor any “violated” by an act of abolition.  The resolution makes virtually this further admission, that if Maryland and Virginia should at once abolish their slavery, Congress might at once abolish it in the District.  The principle goes even further than this, and requires Congress in such case to abolish slavery in the District “by the good faith implied in the cession and acceptance of the territory.”  Since, according to the spirit and scope of the resolution, this “implied good faith” of Maryland and Virginia in making the cession, was, that Congress would do nothing within the District which should counteract the policy, or discredit the “institutions,” or call in question the usages, or even in any way ruffle the prejudices of those states, or do what they might think would unfavorably bear upon their interests; themselves of course being the judges.

But let us dissect another limb of the resolution.  What is to be understood by “that good faith which was IMPLIED?” It is of course an admission that such a condition was not expressed in the acts of cession—­that in their terms there is nothing restricting the power of Congress on the subject of slavery in the District.  This “implied faith,” then, rests on no clause or word in the United States’ Constitution, or in the acts of cession, or in the acts of Congress accepting the cession, nor on any declarations of the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, nor on any act of theirs, nor on any declaration of the people of those states, nor on the testimony of the Washingtons, Jeffersons, Madisons, Chases, Martins, and Jennifers, of those states and times.  The assertion rests on itself alone! Mr. Clay guesses that Maryland and Virginia supposed that Congress would by no means use the power given them by the Constitution, except in such ways as would be well pleasing in the eyes of those states; especially as one of them was the “Ancient Dominion!” And now after half a century, this assumed expectation of Maryland and Virginia, the existence of which is mere matter of conjecture with the 36 senators, is conjured up and duly installed upon the judgment-seat of final appeal, before whose nod constitutions are to flee away, and with whom, solemn grants of power and explicit guaranties are, when weighed in the balance, altogether lighter than vanity!