one is necessary—and
universal
consent will come only with the Greek Kalends and
a “perpetual motion.” A single individual
might thus perpetuate slavery in defiance of the expressed
will of a whole people. The most common form
of this fallacy is given by Mr. Wise, of Virginia,
in his speech, February 16, 1835, in which he denied
the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District,
unless the inhabitants owning slaves petitioned for
it!! Southern members of Congress at the present
session (1837-8) ring changes almost daily upon the
same fallacy. What! pray Congress
to use
a power which it
has not? “It is
required of a man according to what he
hath,”
saith the Scripture. I commend Mr. Wise to Paul
for his ethics. Would that he had got his
logic
of him! If Congress does not possess the power,
why taunt it with its weakness, by asking its exercise?
Petitioning, according to Mr. Wise, is, in matters
of legislation, omnipotence itself; the very
source
of all constitutional power; for,
asking Congress
to do what it
cannot do, gives it the power!—to
pray the exercise of a power that is
not, creates
it! A beautiful theory! Let us work it both
ways. If to petition for the exercise of a power
that is
not, creates it—to petition
against the exercise of a power that
is, annihilates
it. As southern gentlemen are partial to summary
processes, pray, sirs, try the virtue of your own
recipe on “exclusive legislation in all cases
whatsoever;” a better subject for experiment
and test of the prescription could not be had.
But if the petitions of the citizens of the District
give Congress the
right to abolish slavery,
they impose the
duty; if they confer constitutional
authority, they create constitutional
obligation.
If Congress
may abolish because of an expression
of their will, it
must abolish at the bidding
of that will. If the people of the District are
a
source of power to Congress, their
expressed
will has the force of a constitutional provision,
and has the same binding power upon the National Legislature.
To make Congress dependent on the District for authority,
is to make it a
subject of its authority, restraining
the exercise of its own discretion, and sinking it
into a mere organ of the District’s will.
We proceed to another objection.
“The southern states would not have ratified
the constitution, if they had supposed that it gave
this power.” It is a sufficient answer
to this objection, that the northern states would
not have ratified it, if they had supposed that it
withheld the power. If “suppositions”
are to take the place of the constitution—coming
from both sides, they neutralize each other.
To argue a constitutional question by guessing
at the “suppositions” that might have been
made by the parties to it would find small favor in
a court of law. But even a desperate shift is
some easement when sorely pushed. If this question
is to be settled by “suppositions,” suppositions
shall be forthcoming, and that without stint.