The right of petition is founded in the very institution of civil government, and has from time immemorial been acknowledged as among the unquestionable privileges of our English ancestors.  This right springs from the great truth that government is established for the benefit of the governed; and it forms the medium by which the people acquaint their rulers with their wants and their grievances.  So accustomed were the Americans to the exercise of this right, even during their subjection to the British crown, that, on the formation of the Federal Constitution, the Convention not conceiving that it could be endangered, made no provision for its security.  But in the very first Congress that assembled under the new Government, the omission was repaired.  It was thought some case might possibly occur, in which this right might prove troublesome to a dominant faction, who would endeavor to stifle it.  An amendment was therefore proposed and adopted, by which Congress is restrained from making any law abridging “the right of the People, peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  Had it not been for this prudent jealousy of our Fathers, instead of the resolution I have transcribed, we should have had a law, visiting with pains and penalties, all who dared to petition the Federal Government, in behalf of the victims of oppression, held in bondage by its authority.  The present resolution cannot indeed consign such petitioners to the prison or the scaffold, but it makes the right to petition a congressional boon, to be granted or withheld at pleasure, and in the present case effectually withholds it, by tendering it nugatory.

Petitions are to inform the Government of the wishes of the people, and by calling forth the action of the Legislature, to inform the constituents how far their wishes are respected by their representatives.  The information thus mutually given and received is essential to a faithful and enlightened exercise of the right of legislation on the one hand, and of suffrage on the other.  But the resolution we are considering, provides that no petition in relation to slavery, shall be printed for the information of the members, nor referred to a committee to ascertain the truth of its statements; nor shall any vote be taken, in regard to it, by which the People may learn the sentiments of their representatives.

If Congress may thus dispose of petitions on one subject, they may make the same disposition of petitions on any and every other subject.  Our representatives are bound by oath, not to pass any law abridging the right of petition, but if this resolution is constitutional, they may order every petition to be delivered to their door-keeper, and by him to be committed to the flames; for why preserve petitions on which no action can be had?  Had the resolution been directed to petitions for an object palpably unconstitutional, it would still have been without excuse.  The construction of the Constitution is a matter of opinion, and every citizen has a right to express that opinion in a petition, or otherwise.