ANSWER.  Observe that this objection allows the Constitution to be pro-slavery, and admits that there are clauses in it which no abolitionist ought to carry out or support.

And observe, further, that we all agree, that a bad promise is better broken than kept—­that every abolitionist, who has before now taken the oath to the Constitution, is bound to break it, and disobey the pro-slavery clauses of that instrument.  So far there is no difference between us.  But the point in dispute now is, whether a man, having found out that certain requirements of the Constitution are wrong, can, after that, innocently swear to support and obey them, all the while meaning not to do so.

Now I contend that such loose construction of our promises is contrary alike to honor, to fair dealing, and to truthfulness—­that it tends to destroy utterly that confidence between man and man which binds society together, and leads, in matters of government, to absolute tyranny.

The Constitution is a series of contracts made by each individual with every other of the fourteen millions.  A man’s oath is evidence of his assent to this contract.  If I offer a man the copy of an agreement, and he, after reading, swears to perform it, have I not a right to infer from his oath that he assents to the rightfulness of the articles of that paper?  What more solemn form of expressing his assent could he select?  A man’s oath expresses his conviction of the rightfulness of the actions he promises to do, as well as his determination to do them.  If this be not so, I can have no trust in any man’s word.  He may take my money, promise to do what I wish in return, and yet, keeping my money, tell me, on the morrow, that he shall not keep his promise, and never meant to, because the act, his conscience tells him, is wrong.  Who would trust property to such men, or such maxims in the common affairs of life?  Shall we not be as honest in the Senate House as on ’Change?  The North makes a contract with the South by which she receives certain benefits, and agrees to render certain services.  The benefits she carefully keeps—­but the services she refuses to render, because immoral contracts are not binding!  Is this fair dealing?  It is the rule alike of law and common sense, that if we are not able, from any cause, to furnish the article we have agreed to, we ought to return the pay we have received.  If power is put into our hands on certain conditions, and we find ourselves unable to comply with those conditions, we ought to surrender the power back to those who gave it.

Immoral laws are doubtless void, and should not be obeyed.  But the question is here, whether one knowing a law to be immoral, may innocently promise to obey it in order to get into office?  The people have settled the conditions on which one may take office.  The first is, that he assent to their Constitution.  Is it honest to accept power with the intention at the time of not keeping the conditions?—­The rightfulness of those conditions is not here the question.