“It appears to us, that there is an urgent necessity to provide against the inconveniences which result from popular judgment, and to check the disposition for the speedy execution of justice resulting from the unconstitutional principle of a pretended Lynch law, by authorizing the parish court to take cognizance without delay, against every free man who shall be convicted of a crime; from the accusations arising from the mere provocations to the insurrection of the working classes.
“All judicial sentences ought to be based upon law, and the terrible privilege which the populace now have of punishing with death certain crimes, ought to be consecrated by law, powerful interests would not suffice in our view to excuse the interruption of social order, if the public safety was not with us the supreme law.
“This is the reason that whilst we deplore the imperious necessity which exists, we entreat the legislative power to give the sanction of principle to what already exists in fact.”
The Editor of the “New Orleans Bee,” in his paper, Oct 25, 1837, says:
“We remark with regret the frightful list of homicides, whether justifiable or not, that are daily committed in New Orleans. It is not through any inherent vice of legal provision that such outrages are perpetrated with impunity: it is rather in the neglect of the application of the law which exists on this subject.
“We will confine our observation to the dangerous facilities afforded by this code for the escape of the homicide. We are well aware that the laws in question are intended for the distribution of equal justice, yet we have too often witnessed the acquittal of delinquents whom we can denominate by no other title than that of homicides, while the simple affirmation of others has been admitted (in default of testimony) who are themselves the authors of the deed, for which they stand in judgment. The indiscriminate system of accepting bail is a blot on our criminal legislation, and is one great reason why so many violators of the law avoid its penalties. To this doubtless must be ascribed the non-interference of the Attorney General. The law of habeas corpus being subjected to the interpretation of every magistrate, whether versed or not in criminal cases, a degree of arbitrary and incorrect explanation necessarily results. How frequently does it happen that the Mayor or Recorder decides upon the gravest case without putting himself to the smallest trouble to inform the Attorney General, who sometimes only hears of the affair when investigation is no longer possible, or when the criminal has wisely commuted his punishment into temporary or perpetual exile.”