law in question, under this view of it, would be tolerated
by the spirit of Southern slavery?—and
whether, before obedience would be rendered to it,
you would not need to have a different type of servitude,
in the place of slavery? You would—I
know you would—for you have been put to
the trial. When, by a happy providence, a vessel
was driven, the last year, to a West India island,
and the chains of the poor slaves with which it was
filled fell from around them, under freedom’s
magic power, the exasperated South was ready to go
to war with Great Britain.
Then, the law against
delivering up foreign servants to their masters was
not relished by you. The given case comes most
strikingly within the supposed policy of this law.
The Gentile was to be permitted to remain in the land
to which he had fled, and where he would have advantages
for becoming acquainted with the God of the Bible.
Such advantages are they enjoying who escaped from
the confessed heathenism of Southern slavery to the
island in question. They are now taught to read
that “Book of life,” which before, they
were forbidden to read. But again, suppose a
slave were to escape from a West India island into
the Southern States—would you, with your
“domestic institutions,” of which you
are so jealous, render obedience to this Divine law?
No; you would subject him
for ever to a servitude
more severe than that, from which he had escaped.
Indeed, if a
freeman come within a certain portion
of our Southern country, and be so unhappy as to bear
a physical resemblance to the slave, he will be punished
for that resemblance, by imprisonment, and even by
a reduction to slavery.
2d. Southern slaveholders, who, by their laws,
own men as absolutely as they own cattle, would have
it believed, that Jewish masters thus owned their
fellow-men. If they did, why was there so wide
a difference between the commandment respecting the
stray man, and that respecting the stray ox or ass?
The man was not, but the beasts were, to be returned;
and that too, even though their owner was the enemy
of him who met them. (Ex. 23. 4.) I repeat the question;—why
this difference? The only answer is, because
God made the brute to be the property of man;
but He never gave us our noble nature for such degradation.
Man’s title deed, in the eighth Psalm, extends
his right of property to the inanimate and brute creation
only—not to the flesh and bones and spirit
of his fellow-man.
3d. The very different penalties annexed to the
crime of stealing a man, and to that of stealing a
thing, shows the eternal and infinite difference which
God has established between a man and property.
The stealing of a man was surely to be punished
with death; whilst mere property was allowed to atone
for the offence of stealing property.
4th. Who, if not the slave, can be said to be
vexed and oppressed! But God’s command
to his people was, that they should neither “vex
a stranger, nor oppress him.”