Cape Colony, 1823; in Malacca, 1825; in the southern provinces of Birmah, 1826; in Bolivia, 1826; in Peru, Guatemala, and Monte Video, 1828; in Jamaica, Barbados, the Bermudas, the Bahamas, Anguilla, Mauritius, St. Christopers, Nevis, the Virgin Islands, (British), Antigua, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Vincents, Grenada, Berbice, Tobago, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Honduras, Demerara, Essequibo and the Cape of Good Hope, on the 1st of August, 1834.  But waving details, suffice it to say, that England, France, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Germany, have all and often given their testimony to the competency of the legislative power to abolish slavery.  In our own country, the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act of abolition in 1780, Connecticut in 1784; Rhode Island, 1784; New-York, 1799; New-Jersey, in 1804; Vermont, by Constitution, in 1777; Massachusetts, in 1780; and New-Hampshire, in 1784.

When the competency of the law-making power to abolish slavery has thus been recognized every where and for ages, when it has been embodied in the highest precedents, and celebrated in the thousand jubilees of regenerated liberty, is it an achievement of modern discovery, that such a power is a nullity?—­that all these acts of abolition are void, and that the millions disenthralled by them, are, either themselves or their posterity, still legally in bondage?

4.  LEGISLATIVE POWER HAS ABOLISHED SLAVERS IN ITS PARTS.  The law of South Carolina prohibits the working of slaves more than fifteen hours in the twenty-four.  In other words, it takes from the slaveholder his power over nine hours of the slave’s time daily; and if it can take nine hours it may take twenty-four.  The laws of Georgia prohibit the working of slaves on the first day of the week; and if they can do it for the first, they can for the six following.  The law of North Carolina prohibits the “immoderate” correction of slaves.  If it has power to prohibit immoderate correction, it can prohibit moderate correction—­all correction, which would be virtual emancipation; for, take from the master the power to inflict pain, and he is master no longer.  Cease to ply the slave with the stimulus of fear, and he is free.

The Constitution of Mississippi gives the General Assembly power to make laws “to oblige the owners of slaves to treat them with humanity.”  The Constitution of Missouri has the same clause, and an additional one making it the DUTY of the legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to secure the humane treatment of the slaves.  This grant to those legislatures, empowers them to decide what is and what is not “humane treatment.”  Otherwise it gives no “power”—­the clause is mere waste paper, and flouts in the face of a befooled legislature.  A clause giving power to require “humane treatment” covers all the particulars of such treatment—­gives power to exact it in all respects—­requiring