The only ground taken against the right of Congress to abolish slavery in the District is, that it existed in Maryland and Virginia when the cession was made, and “as it still continues in both of them, it could not be abolished without a violation of that good faith which was implied in the cession,” &c.  The argument is not that exclusive sovereignty has no power to abolish slavery within its jurisdiction, nor that the powers of even ordinary legislation cannot do it, nor that the clause granting Congress “exclusive legislation in all cases what soever over such District,” gives no power to do it; but that the unexpressed expectation of one of the parties that the other would not “in all cases” use the power which said party had consented might be used “in all cases,” prohibits the use of it.  The only cardinal point in the discussion, is here not only yielded, but formally laid down by the South as the leading article in their creed on the question of Congressional jurisdiction over slavery in the District.  The reason given why Congress should not abolish, and the sole evidence that if it did, such abolition would be a violation of “good faith,” is that “slavery still continues in those states,”—­thus admitting, that if slavery did not “still continue” in those States, Congress could abolish it in the District.  The same admission is made also in the premises, which state that slavery existed in those states at the time of the cession, &c.  Admitting that if it had not existed there then, but had grown up in the District under United States’ laws, Congress might constitutionally abolish it.  Or that if the ceded parts of those states had been the only parts in which slaves were held under their laws, Congress might have abolished in such a contingency also.  The cession in that case leaving no slaves in those states,—­no “good faith” would be “implied” in it, nor any “violated” by an act of abolition.  The resolution makes virtually this further admission, that if Maryland and Virginia should at once abolish their slavery, Congress might at once abolish it in the District.  The principle goes even further than this, and requires Congress in such case to abolish slavery in the District “by the good faith implied in the cession and acceptance of the territory.”  Since, according to the spirit and scope of the resolution, this “implied good faith” of Maryland and Virginia in making the cession, was, that Congress would do nothing within the District which should counteract the policy, or discredit the “institutions,” or call in question the usages, or even in any way ruffle the prejudices of those states, or do what they might think would unfavorably bear upon their interests; themselves of course being the judges.