“Be it enacted, by the General Assembly of Maryland, that the representatives of this state in the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, appointed to assemble at New-York, on the first Wednesday of March next, be, and they are; hereby authorized and required on the behalf of this state, to cede to the Congress of the United States, any district in this state, not exceeding ten miles square, which the Congress may fix upon, and accept for the seat of government of the United States.”  Laws of Md., v. 2., c. 46.

The cession of Virginia was made on the 3d of December, 1788, in the following words: 

“Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That a tract of country, not exceeding ten miles square, or any lesser quantity, to be located within the limits of the State, and in any part thereof; as Congress may, by law, direct, shall be, and the same is hereby forever ceded and relinquished to the Congress and Government of the United States, in full and absolute right, and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil, as of persons residing or to reside thereon, pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eighth section of the first article of the government of the constitution of the United States.”

But were there no provisos to these acts?  The Maryland act had none.  The Virginia act had this proviso:  “Sect. 2.  Provided, that nothing herein contained, shall be construed to vest in the United States any right of property in the soil, or to affect the rights of individuals therein, otherwise than the same shall or may be transferred by such individuals to the United States.”

This specification touching the soil was merely definitive and explanatory of that clause in the act of cession, “full and absolute right.”  Instead of restraining the power of Congress on slavery and other subjects, it even gives it freer course; for exceptions to parts of a rule, give double confirmation to those parts not embraced in the exceptions.  If it was the design of the proviso to restrict congressional action on the subject of slavery, why is the soil alone specified?  As legal instruments are not paragons of economy in words, might not “John Doe,” out of his abundance, and without spoiling his style, have afforded an additional word—­at least a hint—­that slavery was meant, though nothing was said about it?

But again, Maryland and Virginia, in their acts of cession, declare them to be made “in pursuance of” that clause of the constitution which gives to Congress “exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever” over the ten miles square—­thus, instead of restricting that clause, both States confirm it.  Now, their acts of cession either accorded with that clause of the constitution, or they conflicted with it.  If they conflicted with it, accepting the cessions was a violation of the constitution.  The fact that Congress accepted