too rapidly.  The vote on Mr. Witcher’s motion to postpone the whole subject indefinitely, indicates the true state of opinion in the House.  That was the test question, and was so intended and proclaimed by its mover.  That motion was negatived, 71 to 60; showing a majority of 11, who by that vote, declared their belief that at the proper time, and in the proper mode, Virginia ought to commence a system of gradual abolition.

7.  THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE ASSERTED THIS POWER.  The ordinance of ’87, declaring that there should be “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,” in the North Western Territory, abolished the slavery then existing there.  The Sup.  Court of Mississippi, [Harvey vs.  Decker, Walker’s Mi.  Reps. 36,] declared that the ordinance of ’87 emancipated the slaves then held there.  In this decision the question is argued ably and at great length.  The Supreme Court of La. made the same decision in the case of Forsyth vs.  Nash, 4 Martin’s La.  Reps. 385.  The same doctrine was laid down by Judge Porter, (late United States Senator from La.,) in his decision at the March term of the La.  Supreme Court, 1830, Merry vs.  Chexnaider, 20 Martin’s Reps. 699.

That the ordinance abolished the slavery then existing there is also shown by the fact, that persons holding slaves in the territory petitioned for the repeal of the article abolishing slavery, assigning that as a reason.  “The petition of the citizens of Randolph and St. Clair counties in the Illinois country, stating that they were in possession of slaves, and praying the repeal of that act (the 6th article of the ordinance of ’87) and the passage of a law legalizing slavery there.” [Am.  State papers, Public Lands, v. 1. p. 69.] Congress passed this ordinance before the United States’ Constitution was adopted, when it derived all its authority from the articles of Confederation, which conferred powers of legislation far more restricted than those committed to Congress over the District and Territories by the United States’ Constitution.  Now, we ask, how does the Constitution abridge the powers which Congress possessed under the articles of confederation?

The abolition of the slave trade by Congress, in 1808, is another illustration of the competency of legislative power to abolish slavery.  The African slave trade has become such a mere technic, in common parlance, that the fact of its being proper slavery is overlooked.  The buying and selling, the transportation, and the horrors of the middle passage, were mere incidents of the slavery in which the victims were held.  Let things be called by their own names.  When Congress abolished the African slave trade, it abolished SLAVERY—­supreme slavery—­power frantic with license, trampling a whole hemisphere scathed with its fires, and running down with blood.  True, Congress did not, in the abolition of the slave trade, abolish all the slavery within its jurisdiction, but it did abolish all the slavery in one part of its jurisdiction.  What has rifled it of power to abolish slavery in another part of its jurisdiction, especially in that part where it has “exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever?”