But let us dissect another limb of the resolution. What is to be understood by “that good faith which was IMPLIED?” It is of course an admission that such a condition was not expressed in the acts of cession—that in their terms there is nothing restricting the power of Congress on the subject of slavery in the District—not a word alluding to it, nor one inserted with such an intent. This “implied faith,” then, rests on no clause or word in the United States’ Constitution, or in the acts of cession, or in the acts of Congress accepting the cession, nor does it rest on any declarations of the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia made at the time, or in that generation, nor on any act of theirs, nor on any declaration of the people of those states, nor on the testimony of the Washingtons, Jeffersons, Madisons, Chaces, Martins, and Jennifers, of those states and times. The assertion rests on itself alone! Mr. Clay and the other senators who voted for the resolution, guess that Maryland and Virginia supposed that Congress would by no means use the power given them by the constitution, except in such ways as would be well pleasing in the eyes of those states; especially as one of them was the “Ancient Dominion!” And now after the lapse of half a century, this assumed expectation of Maryland and Virginia, the existence of which is mere matter of conjecture with the 36 senators, is conjured up and duly installed upon the judgment-seat of final appeal, before whose nod constitutions are to flee away, and with whom, solemn grants of power and explicit guaranties are, when weighed in the balance, altogether lighter than vanity!