This specification touching the soil was merely definitive and explanatory of that clause in the act of cession, “full and absolute right.”  Instead of restraining the power of Congress on slavery and other subjects, it even gives it freer course; for exceptions to parts of a rule, give double confirmation to those parts not embraced in the exceptions.  If it was the design of the proviso to restrict congressional action on the subject of slavery, why is the soil alone specified?  As legal instruments are not paragons of economy in words, might not “John Doe,” out of his abundance, and without spoiling his style, have afforded an additional word—­at least a hint—­that slavery was meant, though nothing was said about it?

But again, Maryland and Virginia, in their acts of cession, declare them to be “in pursuance of” that clause of the constitution which gives to Congress “exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over” the ten miles square—­thus, instead of restricting that clause, both States confirm it.  Now, their acts of cession either accorded with that clause of the constitution, or they conflicted with it.  If they conflicted with it, accepting the cessions was a violation of the constitution.  The fact that Congress accepted the cessions, proves that in its view their terms did not conflict with its constitutional grant of power.  The inquiry whether these acts of cession were consistent or inconsistent with the United States’ constitution, is totally irrelevant to the question at issue.  What saith the CONSTITUTION?  That is the question.  Not, what saith Virginia, or Maryland, or—­equally to the point—­John Bull!  If Maryland and Virginia had been the authorized interpreters of the constitution for the Union, these acts of cession could hardly have been magnified more than they have been recently by the southern delegation in Congress.  A true understanding of the constitution can be had, forsooth, only by holding it up in the light of Maryland and Virginia legislation!

We are told, again, that those States would not have ceded the District if they had supposed the constitution gave Congress power to abolish slavery in it.

This comes with an ill grace from Maryland and Virginia.  They knew the constitution.  They were parties to it.  They had sifted it clause by clause, in their State conventions.  They had weighed its words in the balance—­they had tested them as by fire; and finally, after long pondering, they adopted the constitution.  And afterward, self-moved, they ceded the ten miles square, and declared the cession made “in pursuance of” that oft-cited clause, “Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District.”  And now verily “they would not have ceded if they had supposed!” &c.  Cede it they did, and in “full and absolute right both of soil and persons.”