article in their creed on the question of Congressional jurisdiction over slavery in the District.  The sole reason given why Congress should not abolish, and the sole evidence that if it did, such abolition would be a violation of “good faith,” is that “slavery still continues in those states,”—­thus explicitly admitting, that if slavery did not “still continue” in those States, Congress could abolish it in the District.  The same admission is made also in the premises, which state that slavery existed in those states at the time of the cession, &c.  Admitting that if it had not existed there then, but had grown up in the District under United States’ laws, Congress might constitutionally abolish it.  Or that if the ceded parts of those states had been the only parts in which slaves were held under their laws, Congress might have abolished in such a contingency also.  The cession in that case leaving no slaves in those states,—­no “good faith,” would be “implied” in it, nor any “violated,” by an act of abolition.  The principle of the resolution makes this further admission, that if Maryland and Virginia should at once abolish their slavery, Congress might at once abolish it in the District.  The principle goes even further than this, and requires Congress in such case to abolish slavery in the District “by the good faith implied in the cession and acceptance of the territory.”  Since according to the spirit and scope of the resolution, this “implied good faith” of Maryland and Virginia in making the cession, was that Congress would do nothing within the District which should go to counteract the policy, or bring into disrepute the “institutions,” or call in question the usages, or even in any way ruffle the prejudices of those states, or do what they might think would unfavorably bear upon their interests; themselves of course being the judges.

But let us dissect another limb of the resolution.  What is to be understood by “that good faith which was IMPLIED?” It is of course an admission that such a condition was not expressed in the acts of cession—­that in their terms there is nothing restricting the power of Congress on the subject of slavery in the District—­not a word alluding to it, nor one inserted with such an intent.  This “implied faith,” then, rests on no clause or word in the United States’ Constitution, or in the acts of cession, or in the acts of Congress accepting the cession, nor does it rest on any declarations of the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia made at the time, or in that generation, nor on any act of theirs, nor on any declaration of the people of those states, nor on the testimony of the Washingtons, Jeffersons, Madisons, Chaces, Martins, and Jennifers, of those states and times.  The assertion rests on itself alone! Mr. Clay and the other senators who voted for the resolution,