deigns to put breath into its nostrils? Besides,
if the consent of the people of the District be necessary,
the consent of the whole people must be had—not
that of a majority, however large. Majorities,
to be authoritative, must be legal—and
a legal majority without legislative power, right
of representation, or even the electoral franchise,
would be an anomaly. In the District of Columbia,
such a thing as a majority in a legal sense is unknown
to law. To talk of the power of a majority, or
the will of a majority there, is mere mouthing.
A majority? Then it has an authoritative will—and
an organ to make it known—and an executive
to carry it into effect—Where are they?
We repeat it—if the consent of the people
of the District be necessary, the consent of every
one is necessary—and universal
consent will come only with the Greek Kalends and
a “perpetual motion.” A single individual
might thus perpetuate slavery in defiance of the expressed
will of a whole people. The most common form of
this fallacy is given by Mr. Wise, of Virginia, in
his speech, February 16, 1835, in which he denied
the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District,
unless the inhabitants owning slaves petitioned for
it!! Southern members of Congress at the present
session ring changes almost daily upon the same fallacy.
What! pray Congress to use a power which it
has not? “It is required of a man
according to what he hath,” saith the
Scripture. I commend Mr. Wise to Paul for his
ethics. Would that he had got his logic
of him! If Congress does not possess the power,
why taunt it with its weakness, by asking its exercise?
Why mock it by demanding impossibilities? Petitioning,
according to Mr. Wise, is, in matters of legislation,
omnipotence itself; the very source of all constitutional
power; for, asking Congress to do what it cannot
do, gives it the power—to pray the exercise
of a power that is not, creates it. A
beautiful theory! Let us work it both ways.
If to petition for the exercise of a power that is
not, creates it—to petition against
the exercise of a power that is, annihilates
it. As southern gentlemen are partial to summary
processes, pray, sirs, try the virtue of your own
recipe on “exclusive legislation in all cases
whatsoever;” a better subject for experiment
and test of the prescription could not be had.
But if the petitions of the citizens of the District
give Congress the right to abolish slavery,
they impose the duty; if they confer constitutional
authority, they create constitutional obligation.
If Congress may abolish because of an expression
of their will, it must abolish at the bidding
of that will. If the people of the District are
a source of power to Congress, their expressed
will has the force of a constitutional provision,
and has the same binding power upon the National Legislature.
To make Congress dependent on the District for authority,
is to make it a subject of its authority, restraining
the exercise of its own discretion, and sinking it
into a mere organ of the District’s will.
We proceed to another objection.