tear him from home, drag him across the line into the land of Israel, and hold him as a slave—­ah! that alters the case, and you may perpetrate the violence now with impunity!  Would greater favor have been shown to this new comer than to the old residents—­those who had been servants in Jewish families perhaps for a generation?  Were the Israelites commanded to exercise towards him, uncircumcised and out of the covenant, a justice and kindness denied to the multitudes who were circumcised, and within the covenant?  But, the objector finds small gain to his argument on the supposition that the covenant respected merely the fugitives from the surrounding nations, while it left the servants of the Israelites in a condition against their wills.  In that case, the surrounding nations would adopt retaliatory measures, and become so many asylums for Jewish fugitives.  As these nations were not only on every side of them, but in their midst, such a proclamation would have been an effectual lure to men whose condition was a constant counteraction of will.  Besides the same command which protected the servant from the power of his foreign master, protected him equally from the power of an Israelite.  It was not, merely “Thou shalt not deliver him unto his master,” but “he shall dwell with thee, in that place which he shall choose in one of thy gates where it liketh him best.”  Every Israelite was forbidden to put him in any condition against his will.  What was this but a proclamation, that all who chose to live in the land and obey the laws, were left to their own free will, to dispose of their services at such a rate, to such persons, and in such places as they pleased?  Besides, grant that this command prohibited the sending back of foreign servants only, there was no law requiring the return of servants who had escaped from the Israelites. Property lost, and cattle escaped, they were required to return, but not escaped servants.  These verses contain, 1st, a command, “Thou shalt not deliver,” &c., 2d. a declaration of the fugitive’s right of free choice, and of God’s will that he should exercise it at his own discretion; and 3d, a command guarding this right, namely, “Thou shalt not oppress him,” as though God had said, “If you restrain him from exercising his own choice, as to the place and condition of his residence, it is oppression, and shall not be tolerated."[A]

[Footnote A:  Perhaps it may be objected that this view of Deut. xxiii. 15, 16, makes nonsense of Ex. xxi. 27, which provides that if a man strikes out his servant’s tooth he shall let him go free.  Small favor indeed if the servant might set himself free whenever he pleased!  Answer—­The former passage might remove the servant from the master’s authority, without annulling the master’s legal claims upon the servant, if he had paid him in advance and had not received from him an equivalent, and this equally, whether his master were a Jew or a Gentile.  The latter passage, “He shall let him go free for his tooth’s sake," not only freed the servant from the master’s authority, but also from any pecuniary claim which the master might have on account of having paid his wages in advance; and this as a compensation, for the loss of a tooth.]