as he pleased, he was not to be punished, if he destroyed it.  Whether the servant died under the master’s hand, or after a day or two, he was equally his property, and the objector admits that in the first case the master is to be “surely punished” for destroying his own property! The other inference is, that since the continuance of a day or two, cleared the master of intent to kill, the loss of the slave would be a sufficient punishment for inflicting the injury which caused his death.  This inference makes the Mosaic law false to its own principles.  A pecuniary loss was no part of the legal claim, where a person took the life of another.  In such case, the law spurned money, whatever the sum.  God would not cheapen human life, by balancing it with such a weight.  “Ye shall take NO SATISFACTION for the life of a murderer, but he shall surely be put to death.”  Num. xxxv. 31.  Even in excusable homicide, where an axe slipped from the helve and killed a man, no sum of money availed to release from confinement in the city of refuge, until the death of the High Priest.  Numb. xxxv. 32.  The doctrine that the loss of the servant would be a penalty adequate to the desert of the master, admits his guilt and his desert of some punishment, and it prescribes a kind of punishment, rejected by the law in all cases where man took the life of man, whether with or without the intent to kill.  In short, the objector annuls an integral part of the system—­makes a new law, and coolly metes out such penalty as he thinks fit.  Divine legislation revised and improved!  The master who struck out his servant’s tooth, whether intentionally or not, was required to set him free.  The pecuniary loss to the master was the same as though he had killed him.  Look at the two cases.  A master beats his servant so that he dies of his wounds; another accidentally strikes out his servant’s tooth,—­the pecuniary loss of both cases is the same.  If the loss of the slave’s services is punishment sufficient for the crime of killing him, would God command the same punishment for the accidental knocking out of a tooth? Indeed, unless the injury was done inadvertantly, the loss of the servant’s services was only a part of the punishment—­mere reparation to the individual for injury done; the main punishment, that strictly judicial, was reparation to the community.  To set the servant free, and thus proclaim his injury, his right to redress, and the measure of it—­answered not the ends of public justice.  The law made an example of the offender.  That “those that remain might hear and fear.”  “If a man cause a blemish in his neighbor, as he hath done, so shall it be done unto him.  Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth.  Ye shall have one manner of law as well for the STRANGER as for one of your own country.”  Lev xxiv. 19, 20, 22.  Finally, if a master smote out his servant’s tooth the law smote out his tooth—­thus redressing the public wrong; and it cancelled the servant’s obligation to the master, thus giving some compensation for the injury done, and exempting him form perilous liabilities in future.