Now in the mind of Mr. Southey reason has no place at all, as either leader or follower, as either sovereign or slave.  He does not seem to know what an argument is.  He never uses arguments himself.  He never troubles himself to answer the arguments of his opponents.  It has never occurred to him, that a man ought to be able to give some better account of the way in which he has arrived at his opinions than merely that it is his will and pleasure to hold them.  It has never occurred to him that there is a difference between assertion and demonstration, that a rumour does not always prove a fact, that a single fact, when proved, is hardly foundation enough for a theory, that two contradictory propositions cannot be undeniable truths, that to beg the question is not the way to settle it, or that when an objection is raised, it ought to be met with something more convincing than “scoundrel” and “blockhead.”

It would be absurd to read the works of such a writer for political instruction.  The utmost that can be expected from any system promulgated by him is that it may be splendid and affecting, that it may suggest sublime and pleasing images.  His scheme of philosophy is a mere day-dream, a poetical creation, like the Domdaniel cavern, the Swerga, or Padalon; and indeed it bears no inconsiderable resemblance to those gorgeous visions.  Like them, it has something of invention, grandeur, and brilliancy.  But, like them, it is grotesque and extravagant, and perpetually violates even that conventional probability which is essential to the effect of works of art.

The warmest admirers of Mr. Southey will scarcely, we think, deny that his success has almost always borne an inverse proportion to the degree in which his undertakings have required a logical head.  His poems, taken in the mass, stand far higher than his prose works.  His official Odes, indeed, among which the Vision of Judgement must be classed, are, for the most part, worse than Pye’s and as bad as Cibber’s; nor do we think him generally happy in short pieces.  But his longer poems, though full of faults, are nevertheless very extraordinary productions.  We doubt greatly whether they will be read fifty years hence; but that, if they are read, they will be admired, we have no doubt whatever....

The extraordinary bitterness of spirit which Mr. Southey manifests towards his opponents is, no doubt, in a great measure to be attributed to the manner in which he forms his opinions.  Differences of taste, it has often been remarked, produce greater exasperation than differences on points of science.  But this is not all.  A peculiar austerity marks almost all Mr. Southey’s judgments of men and actions.  We are far from blaming him for fixing on a high standard of morals and for applying that standard to every case.  But rigour ought to be accompanied by discernment; and of discernment Mr. Southey seems to be utterly destitute.  His mode of judging is monkish.