If the resolution had been left in its original form it is not to be presumed that it could ever have received the assent of a majority of the Senate, for the acts therein specified as violations of the Constitution and laws were clearly within the limits of the Executive authority.  They are the “dismissing the late Secretary of the Treasury because he would not, contrary to his sense of his own duty, remove the money of the United States in deposit with the Bank of the United States and its branches in conformity with the President’s opinion, and appointing his successor to effect such removal, which has been done.”  But as no other specification has been substituted, and as these were the “Executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue” principally referred to in the course of the discussion, they will doubtless be generally regarded as the acts intended to be denounced as “an assumption of authority and power not conferred by the Constitution or laws, but in derogation of both.”  It is therefore due to the occasion that a condensed summary of the views of the Executive in respect to them should be here exhibited.

By the Constitution “the executive power is vested in a President of the United States.”  Among the duties imposed upon him, and which he is sworn to perform, is that of “taking care that the laws be faithfully executed.”  Being thus made responsible for the entire action of the executive department, it was but reasonable that the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws—­a power in its nature executive—­should remain in his hands.  It is therefore not only his right, but the Constitution makes it his duty, to “nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint” all “officers of the United States whose appointments are not in the Constitution otherwise provided for,” with a proviso that the appointment of inferior officers may be vested in the President alone, in the courts of justice, or in the heads of Departments.

The executive power vested in the Senate is neither that of “nominating” nor “appointing.”  It is merely a check upon the Executive power of appointment.  If individuals are proposed for appointment by the President by them deemed incompetent or unworthy, they may withhold their consent and the appointment can not be made.  They check the action of the Executive, but can not in relation to those very subjects act themselves nor direct him.  Selections are still made by the President, and the negative given to the Senate, without diminishing his responsibility, furnishes an additional guaranty to the country that the subordinate executive as well as the judicial offices shall be filled with worthy and competent men.