The circumstances under which Mr. Serurier’s note was written are material in considering its true import.  The payment stipulated by a treaty duly ratified on both sides had just been formally refused by a vote of the Chamber of Deputies.  More than two years had passed since it had been proclaimed as the law of the land in the United States, and ever since the articles favorable to France had been in constant operation.  Notice of this refusal had some time before been received by the President.  It would have been his duty, had nothing else occurred, to communicate to Congress this event, so unexpected and so injurious to the interest of the country.  One circumstance prevented the performance of this duty and justified the omission.  The notice of the rejection was accompanied by information that the minister of France was instructed to make explanations and engagements on the subject, and that a ship of war would be dispatched with his instructions.  The President had waited a month for the arrival of this ship.  An unusually long session of Congress still afforded an opportunity for making the communication, even after her arrival.  If made it would undoubtedly have produced consequences the nature of which may be imagined by considering the events that have since occurred.  It was necessary, then, to prevent an interruption of the friendly relations between the two countries, that this communication should be postponed until the subsequent session of Congress; longer than that it was well known that it could not be deferred.  This was clearly and explicitly stated in a conference between Mr. Serurier and the Secretary of State of the United States, in which the former gave the promise in question.  But the President desired to have the engagement in a written and official form (and as Mr. Serurier expresses it in his letter), “pour des causes prises dans les necessites de votre Gouvernement” What governmental necessity does he allude to?  Clearly that which obliged the President to communicate these engagements to Congress at the next session.

Here, then, we have a stipulation made under special orders, sent out by a ship dispatched for that express purpose, communicated first verbally in an official conference, afterwards reduced to writing and delivered to the proper officers, for the double purpose of justifying the President for not making an immediate communication at their then session and also to serve as a pledge which he might exhibit if unredeemed at their next.  These objects are well stated by Mr. Serurier to be “that the Government of the Republic may avoid, with a providential solicitude, in this unsettled state of things all that may become a cause of new irritation between the two countries, endanger the treaty, and raise obstacles that may become insurmountable to the views of conciliation and harmony which animate the councils of the King.”  It was, then, to avoid a communication to Congress, which Mr. Serurier saw would endanger the peace of the two countries, that this engagement was made.  Surely, then, every word of a stipulation made under such circumstances and for such important purposes must have been duly considered and its import properly weighed, first by the cabinet who directed, afterwards by the minister who delivered and the Government which received it.