declared to be a private communication, not an official one.  I further stated that I made this communication without instructions, merely to counteract misapprehensions and from an earnest desire to rectify errors which might have serious consequences.  I added that it was very unfortunate that an earlier call of the Chambers had not been made in consequence of Mr. Serurier’s promise, the noncompliance with which was of a nature to cause serious disquietude with the Government of the United States.  I found immediately that this was the part of the message that had most seriously affected the King, for Comte de Rigny immediately took up the argument, endeavoring to show that the Government had acted in good faith, relying principally on the danger of a second rejection had the Chambers been called at an early day expressly for this object I replied by repeating that the declaration made by Mr. Serurier was a positive and formal one, and that it had produced a forbearance on the part of the President to lay the state of the case before Congress.  In this conference, which was a long one, we both regretted that any misunderstanding should interrupt the good intelligence of two nations having so many reasons to preserve it and so few of conflicting interests.  He told me (what I knew before) that the exposition was prepared, and that the law would have been presented the day after that on which the message was received.  He showed me the document, read part of it to me, and expressed regret that the language of the message prevented it being sent in.  I said that I hoped the excitement would soon subside and give place to better feelings, in which I thought he joined with much sincerity.  It is perhaps necessary to add that an allusion was made by me to the change of ministry in November and the reinstatement of the present ministers, which I told him I had considered as a most favorable occurrence, and that I had so expressed myself in my communications to you, but that this circumstance was unknown at Washington when the message was delivered; and I added that the hopes of success held out in the communication to which I referred and the assurances it contained that the ministers would zealously urge the adoption of the law might probably have imparted the same hopes to the President and have induced some change in the measure he had recommended, but that the formation of the Dupin ministry, if known, must have had a very bad effect on the President’s mind, as many of that ministry were known to be hostile to the treaty.

When I took leave the minister requested me to reflect on the propriety of presenting a note of our conversation, which he said should be formal or otherwise, as I should desire.  I told him I would do so, and inform him on the next morning by 11 o’clock.  We parted, as I thought, on friendly terms, and in the evening, meeting him at the Austrian ambassador’s, I told him that on reflection I had determined to wait the arrival of the packet of the 16th before I