the expression of royal freedom in loyal service,
of sovereignty in obedience, courage in concession,
and strength in forbearance, which makes manners noble.
Low may he bow, not with loss, but with access of
dignity, who bows with an elevated and ascending heart:
there is nothing loftier, nothing less allied to abject
behavior, than this grand lowliness. The worm,
because it is low, cannot be lowly; but man, uplifted
in token of supremacy, may kneel in adoration, bend
in courtesy, and stoop in condescension. Only
a great pride, that is, a great and reverential repose
in one’s own being, renders possible a noble
humility, which is a great and reverential acknowledgment
of the being of others; this humility in turn sustains
a higher self-reverence; this again resolves itself
into a more majestic humility; and so run, in ever
enhancing wave, the great circles of inward honor
and outward grace. And without this self-sustaining
return of the action into itself, each quality feeding
itself from its correlative opposite, there can be
no high behavior. This is the reason why qualities
loftiest in kind and largest in measure are vulgarly
mistaken, not for their friendly opposites, but for
their mere contraries,—why a very profound
sensibility, a sensibility, too, peculiarly of the
spirit, not of nerve only, is sure to be named coldness,
as Mr. Ruskin recently remarks,—why vast
wealth of good pride, in its often meek acceptance
of wrong, in its quiet ignoring of insult, in its
silent superiority to provocation, passes with the
superficial and petulant for poverty of pride and mere
mean-spiritedness,—why a courage which is
not partial, but total, coexisting, as it always
does, with a noble peacefulness, with a noble inaptness
for frivolous hazards, and a noble slowness to take
offence, is, in its delays and forbearances, thought
by the half-courageous to be no better than cowardice;—it
is, as we have said, because great qualities revolve
and repose in orbits of reciprocation with their opposites,
which opposites are by coarse and ungentle eyes misdeemed
to be contraries. Feeling transcendently deep
and powerful is unimpassioned and far lower-voiced
than indifference and unfeelingness, being wont to
express itself, not by eloquent ebullition, but by
extreme understatement, or even by total silence.
Sir Walter Raleigh, when at length he found himself
betrayed to death—and how basely betrayed!—by
Sir Lewis Stukely, only said, “Sir Lewis, these
actions will not turn to your credit.”
The New Testament tells us of a betrayal yet more quietly
received. These are instances of noble manners.
What actions are absolutely moral is determined by application of the same law,—those only which repose wholly in themselves, being to themselves at once motive and reward. “Miserable is he,” says the “Bhagavad Gita,” “whose motive to action lies, not in the action itself, but in its reward.” Duty purchased with covenant of special delights is not duty, but is the most pointed possible denial of it. The just man looks not beyond justice; the merciful reposes in acts of mercy; and he who would be bribed to equity and goodness is not only bad, but shameless. But of this no further words.