It was written that we should fail in the field.  We sought to take Richmond, with an army of force that appeared to be adequate to the work.  We were beaten; and after some months of severe warfare, the country had the supreme felicity of celebrating the eighty-sixth anniversary of its Independence by thanking Heaven that its principal army had escaped capture by falling back to the fever-laden banks of a river on which lay a naval force so strong as to prevent the further advance of the victorious Southrons.  The exertions that were made to remove that army from a place that threatened its total destruction through pestilence led to another series of actions, in which we were again beaten, and the Secession armies found themselves hard by the very station which they had so long held after their victory at Bull Run.  Had their numbers been half as large as we estimated them by way of accounting for our defeats, they could have marched into Washington, and the American Union would have been at an end, while the Southern Confederacy would have taken the place which the United States had possessed among the nations.  Fortunately, the enemy were not strong enough to hazard everything upon one daring stroke.  General Lee was as prudent, or as timid, after his victories over General Pope, as, according to some authorities, Hannibal was after winning “the field of blood” at Cannae.  What he did, however, was sufficient to show how serious was the danger that threatened us.  If he could not take Washington, which stood for Rome, he might take Baltimore, which should be Capua.  He entered Maryland, and his movements struck dismay into Pennsylvania.  Harrisburg was marked for seizure, and the archives of the second State of the Union were sent to New York; and Philadelphia was considered so unsafe as to cause men to remove articles of value thence to her ancient rival’s protection.  That the enemy meant to invade the North cannot well be doubted; but the resistance they encountered, leading to their defeat at South Mountain and Antietam, forced them to retreat.  Had they won at Antietam, not only would Washington have been cut off from land-communication with the North, but Pennsylvania would have been invaded, and the Southrons would have fattened on the produce of her rich fields.  While these things were taking place in Virginia and Maryland, Fortune had proved equally unfavorable to us in the South and the Southwest.  We had been defeated near Charleston, and most of our troops at Port Royal had been transferred to Virginia.  Charleston and Mobile saw ships constantly entering their harbors, bringing supplies to the Secession forces.  Wilmington and Savannah were less liable to attack than some Northern towns.  An attack on Vicksburg had ended in Federal failure.  By the aid of gunboats we had prevented the enemy from taking Baton Rouge, and destroyed their iron-clad Arkansas; but our soldiers had to abandon that town, and leave it to be watched by ships, while they hastened