was their conduct. The Rebels were at least as
sensitive on the subject of their military character
as they were on that of slavery; and yet, while we
could not be sufficiently servile on the latter subject,
we acted most offensively on the former. We asserted,
in every form and variety of language, our ability
to “put them down;” and but for the circumstance
that not the slightest atom of ability marked the
management of our military affairs, we should have
made our boasting good. Men who could not say
enough to satisfy themselves on the point of the right
of the chivalrous Southrons to create, breed, work,
and sell slaves, were equally loud-mouthed in their
expressed purpose to “put down” the said
Southrons because they had rebelled, and rebelled
only because they were slaveholders, and for the purpose
of placing slavery beyond the reach of wordy assault
in the country of which it should be the governing
power. There has been much complaint that foreigners
have not understood the nature of our quarrel, and
that the general European hostility to the American
national cause is owing to their ignorance of American
affairs. How that may be we shall not stop to
inquire; but it is beyond dispute that no European
community has ever displayed a more glaring ignorance
of the character of the contest here waged than was
exhibited by most Americans in the early months of
that contest, and down to a recent period. The
war was treated by nearly the whole people as if slavery
had no possible connection with it, and as if all
mention of slavery in matters pertaining to the war
were necessarily an impertinence, a foreign subject
lugged into a domestic discussion. Three-fourths
of the people were disposed querulously to ask why
Abolitionists couldn’t let slavery alone in
war-time. It was a bad thing, was Abolitionism,
in time of peace; but its badness was vastly increased
when we had war upon our hands. Half the other
fourth of the citizens were disposed to agree with
the majority, but very shame kept them silent.
It was only the few who had a proper conception of
the state of things, and they had little influence
with the people, and, consequently, none with Government.
Had they said much, or attempted to do anything, probably
they would have found Federal arms directed against
themselves with much more of force and effectiveness
in their use than were manifested when they were directed
against the Rebels. When a Union general could
announce that he would make use of the Northern soldiers
under his command to destroy slaves who should be
so audacious as to rebel against Rebels, and the announcement
was received with rapturous approval at the North,
it was enough to convince every intelligent and reflecting
man that no just idea of the struggle we were engaged
in was common, and that a blind people were following
blind leaders into the ditch,—even into
that “last ditch” to which the Secessionists
have so often been doomed, but in which they so obstinately
continue to refuse to find their own and their cause’s
grave.