In the administration of domestic affairs you expect a devoted integrity in the public service and an observance of rigid economy in all departments, so marked as never justly to be questioned.  If this reasonable expectation be not realized, I frankly confess that one of your leading hopes is doomed to disappointment, and that my efforts in a very important particular must result in a humiliating failure.  Offices can be properly regarded only in the light of aids for the accomplishment of these objects, and as occupancy can confer no prerogative nor importunate desire for preferment any claim, the public interest imperatively demands that they be considered with sole reference to the duties to be performed.  Good citizens may well claim the protection of good laws and the benign influence of good government, but a claim for office is what the people of a republic should never recognize.  No reasonable man of any party will expect the Administration to be so regardless of its responsibility and of the obvious elements of success as to retain persons known to be under the influence of political hostility and partisan prejudice in positions which will require not only severe labor, but cordial cooperation.  Having no implied engagements to ratify, no rewards to bestow, no resentments to remember, and no personal wishes to consult in selections for official station, I shall fulfill this difficult and delicate trust, admitting no motive as worthy either of my character or position which does not contemplate an efficient discharge of duty and the best interests of my country.  I acknowledge my obligations to the masses of my countrymen, and to them alone.  Higher objects than personal aggrandizement gave direction and energy to their exertions in the late canvass, and they shall not be disappointed.  They require at my hands diligence, integrity, and capacity wherever there are duties to be performed.  Without these qualities in their public servants, more stringent laws for the prevention or punishment of fraud, negligence, and peculation will be vain.  With them they will be unnecessary.

But these are not the only points to which you look for vigilant watchfulness.  The dangers of a concentration of all power in the general government of a confederacy so vast as ours are too obvious to be disregarded.  You have a right, therefore, to expect your agents in every department to regard strictly the limits imposed upon them by the Constitution of the United States.  The great scheme of our constitutional liberty rests upon a proper distribution of power between the State and Federal authorities, and experience has shown that the harmony and happiness of our people must depend upon a just discrimination between the separate rights and responsibilities of the States and your common rights and obligations under the General Government; and here, in my opinion, are the considerations which should form the true basis of future concord in regard to the questions which have most seriously disturbed public tranquillity.  If the Federal Government will confine itself to the exercise of powers clearly granted by the Constitution, it can hardly happen that its action upon any question should endanger the institutions of the States or interfere with their right to manage matters strictly domestic according to the will of their own people.