the project, he would have been “snuffed out” as easily as was Murat, when, in 1815, he sought to recover the Neapolitan throne.  If Austrian ships had not prevented him from landing in Sicily, Austrian troops would have destroyed him in that island.  Nay, it is but reasonable to believe that Bomba’s navy and army would have been amply sufficient to do their master’s work.  That his men were not wanting in courage and conduct has been proved by their deeds since the tyrant left his capital, on the Volturno and around Capua and at Gaeta.  It was not want of bravery that led to their failure in Sicily, but the belief that their employer’s system had failed, and that he and they were given up to the vengeance of Italy, supposing the Italians to be strong enough to do justice on them.  They took courage when European circumstances led them to conclude that Austria would be advised, at the Warsaw Conference, to use her forces for the restoration of the old order of things in Italy, and receive the support of Russia and Prussia.  To deserve such aid from the North, the Neapolitan army struggled hard, but in vain.  The Absolutist cause was lost in Naples when the sovereigns met in the Polish capital; and though, forty years earlier, this would have been held an additional reason for the entrance of the barbarians into Italy, the successes of the patriots must have had their proper weight with the Prince Regent of Prussia and the Czar, who are understood to have been as deaf as adders to the charming of their young brother from Vienna.  What was resolved upon at Warsaw the world has no positive means of knowing, and but little reliance is to be placed upon the rumors that have been so abundant; but, as Austria has not moved against the Italians, and as the instructions to her new commander-in-chief in Venetia (Von Benedek) are reported to be strong on the point of non-intervention, we are at liberty to infer that she accepts all that has been done as accomplished facts, and means to stand upon the defensive, in the hope of gaining moral support by her moderation in being outwardly content with less than half the spoil which was given to her at the expense of Italy, when Europe was “settled,” for the time, four-and-forty years ago.

The action of the Sardinian government, in sending its soldiers against the legal banditti whom Lamoriciere had sought to drill into the semblance of an army, which was a direct attack on the Pope, and the subsequent employment of those soldiers, and of the Sardinian fleet, against the forces of Francis II., were model pieces of statesmanship, and worthy of the great man whose name and fame have become indissolubly associated with the redemption of Italy.  The decision thus to act could not have been taken without the consent of Napoleon III. having first been had and obtained; and there is probably much truth in the story, that, when Lamoriciere had the coolness to threaten his conquerors with the vengeance of the Emperor, they told him,