Italy was delivered by the war of 1859, and that war was terminated by the peace of Villafranca.  For the moment, it seemed as if there were to be a restoration of the petty princes who had fled from Tuscany and Parma and Modena, and that an Italian Confederation had been resolved upon, in which the noxious influences of Austria and Naples and Papal Rome should stifle the pure principles upheld by Sardinia.  A few months sufficed to show that these evils existed in apprehension only.  The Italians, by the withdrawal of the French, were thrown upon their own resources, and by their conduct they dissipated the belief that they were unequal to the emergency.  Had the war been continued, had Venetia been conquered, and had the last of the Austrians been driven beyond the Isonzo, Italy would have been the prize of French valor and genius; for all this must have been done on the instant, and before the Italians, less the Sardinians, could have taken an effective part in the war.  The most devoted believer in the patriotism and bravery of the Italians must perforce admit that they had little to do with the war of 1859.  Leaving the Sardinians aside, the Italian element in that contest was scarcely appreciable.  This we say without meaning any reflection on the Italians.  There were many good reasons why they should remain quiet.  In common with the rest of the world, even France herself, the war took them by surprise, Austria bringing it on weeks, if not months, before Napoleon III. had meant it to begin.  They, too, had seen their country so often abused by those who had conquered there, that they had some excuse for waiting the progress of events.  The most industrious and studied efforts had been made to convince them that the object of the ruler of France was the realization of another Napoleonic idea, namely, the restoration of that Kingdom of Italy which perished in 1814; and though the rule of Napoleon I. was the best that Italy had known for three hundred years, it was hardly worth while to enter upon a doubtful fight for its restoration.  Hence the majority of the people of Italy were not so active as they might have been; and their coolness is said to have had much effect on the mind of the victor, who must have thought that the people he had come to deliver were taking things very easily, and who could not have felt much flattered, when assured, in the politest terms, that those people believed him to be a selfish liar.  His work, therefore, was but partially performed.  Instead of halting on the shores of the historical Adriatic, his armies drew up on the banks of the classic Mincius.  Trance had done her part; let Italy do the rest, if it were to be done.  Thus abdicating his original purpose, and probably feeling much as William III. felt when the English were so slow in joining him that he talked of returning to his ships, Napoleon III. gave up his power to dictate the future of Italy.  He had no right, thereafter, to say that the Bourbons should