scattered interferences from without, and all becoming
transformed into a series of disconnected miracles.
An order of nature such as would be destroyed by God’s
action does not exist; God brings everything to pass;
even the passage of motion from one body to another
is his work. Further, Geulincx expressly says
that God has imposed such
laws on motion that
it harmonizes with the soul’s free volition,
of which, however, it is entirely independent (similar
statements occur also in De la Forge). And with
this our thinker appears—as Pfleiderer[1]
emphasizes—closely to approach the pre-established
harmony of Leibnitz. The occasionalistic theory
certainly constitutes the preliminary step to the
Leibnitzian; but an essential difference separates
the two. The advance does not consist in the
substitution by Leibnitz of one single miracle at creation
for a number of isolated and continually recurring
ones, but (as Leibnitz himself remarks, in reply to
the objection expressed by Father Lami, that a perpetual
miracle is no miracle) in the exchange of the immediate
causality of God for natural causation. With
Geulincx mind and body act on each other, but not
by their own power; with Leibnitz the monads do not
act on one another, but they act by their own power.[2]—When
Geulincx in the same connection advances to the statements
that, in view of the limitedness and passivity of
finite things, God is the only truly active, because
the only independent, being in the world, that all
activity is his activity, that the human (finite)
spirit is related to the divine (infinite) spirit as
the individual body to space in general,
viz.,
as a section of it, so that, by thinking away all
limitations from our mind, we find God in us and ourselves
in him, it shows how nearly he verges on pantheism.
[Footnote 1: Edm. Pfleiderer, Geulincx,
als Hauptvertreter der occasionalistischen Metaphysik
und Ethik, Tuebingen, 1882; the same, Leibniz
und Geulincx mit besonderer Beziehung auf ihr Uhrengleichnis,
Tuebingen, 1884.]
[Footnote 2: See Ed. Zeller, Sitzungsberichte
der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1884,
p. 673 seq.; Eucken, Philosophische Monatshefte,
vol. xix., 1893, p. 525 seq; vol. xxiii., 1887,
p. 587 seq.]
Geulincx’s services to noetics have been duly
recognized by Ed. Grimm (Jena, 1875), although with
an excessive approximation to Kant. In this field
he advances many acute and suggestive thoughts, as
the deduction which reappears in Lotze, that the actually
existent world of figure and motion cognized by thought,
though the real world, is poorer than the wonderful
world of motley sensuous appearance conjured forth
in our minds on the occasion of the former, that the
latter is the more beautiful and more worthy of a
divine author. Further, the conviction, also held
by Lotze, that the fundamental activities of the mind
cannot be defined, but only known through inner experience