Geulincx himself, besides two inaugural addresses at Leyden (as Lector in 1662, Professor Extraordinary in 1665), published the following treatises:  Quaestiones Quodlibeticae (in the second edition, 1665, entitled Saturnalia) with an important introductory discourse; Logica Fundamentis Suis Restituta, 1662; Methodus Inveniendi Argumenta (new edition by Bontekoe, 1675); and the first part of his Ethics—­De Virtute et Primis ejus Proprietatibus, quae vulgo Virtutes Cardinales Vocantur, Tractatus Ethicus Primus, 1665.  This chief work was issued complete in all six parts with the title, [Greek:  Gnothi seauton] sive Ethica, 1675, by Bontekoe, under the pseudonym Philaretus.  The Physics, 1688, the Metaphysics, 1691, and the Annotata Majora in Cartesii Principia Philosophiae, 1691, were also posthumous publications, from the notes of his pupils.  In view of the rarity of these volumes, and the importance of the philosopher, it is welcome news that J.P.N.  Land has undertaken an edition of the collected works, in three volumes, of which the first two have already appeared.[1] The Hague, 1891-92.[2]

[Footnote 1:  On vol. i. cf.  Eucken, Philosophische Monatshefte, vol. xxviii., 1892, p,200 seq.]

[Footnote 2:  On Geulincx see V. van der Haeghen, Geulincx, Etude sur sa Vie, sa Philosophie, et ses Ouvrages, Ghent, 1886, including a complete bibliography; and Land in vol. iv. of the Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie, 1890. [English translation, Mind, vol. xvi. p. 223 seq.]]

Geulincx bases the occasionalistic position on the principle, quod nescis, quomodo fiat, id non facis.  Unless I know how an event happens, I am not its cause.  Since I have no consciousness how my decision to speak or to walk is followed by the movement of my tongue or limbs, I am not the one who effects these.  Since I am just as ignorant how the sensation in my mind comes to pass as a sequel to the motion in the sense-organ; since, further, the body as an unconscious and non-rational being can effect nothing, it is neither I nor the body that causes the sensation.  Both the bodily movement and the sense-impression are, rather, the effects of a higher power, of the infinite spirit.  The act of my will and the sense-stimulus are only causae occasionales for the divine will, in an incomprehensible way, to effect, in the one case, the execution of the movement of the limbs resolved upon, and, in the other, the origin of the perception; they are (unsuitable) instruments, effective only in the hand of God; he brings it to pass that my will goes out beyond my soul, and that corporeal motion has results in it.  The meaning of this doctrine is misapprehended when it is assumed,—­an assumption to which the Leibnitzian account of occasionalism may mislead one,—­that in it the continuity of events, alike in the material and the psychical world, is interrupted by frequent