natures,” which form, as it were, the alphabet of nature or the colors on her palette, by the combination of which she produces her varied pictures; e. g., the nature of heat and cold, of a red color, of gravity, and also of age, of death.  Now the question to be investigated becomes, What, then, is heat, redness, etc.?  The ground essence and law of the natures consist in certain forms, which Bacon conceives in a Platonic way as concepts and substances, but phenomenal ones, and, at the same time, with Democritus, as the grouping or motion of minute material particles.  Thus the form of heat is a particular kind of motion, the form of whiteness a determinate arrangement of material particles.  Cf.  Natge, Ueber F. Bacons Formenlehre, Leipsic, 1891, in which Heussler’s view is developed in more detail. [Cf. further, Fowler’s Bacon, English Philosophers Series, 1881, chap. iv.—­TR.]]

[Footnote 3:  The Baconian method is to be called induction, it is true, only in the broad sense.  Even before Sigwart, Apelt, Theorie der Induction, 1854, pp. 151, 153, declared that the question it discussed was essentially a method of abstraction.  This, however, does not detract from the fame of Bacon as the founder, of the theory of inductive investigation (in later times carefully elaborated by Mill).]

Bacon intended that his reforming principles should accrue to the benefit of practical philosophy also, but gave only aphoristic hints to this end.  Everything is impelled by two appetites, of which the one aims at individual welfare, the other at the welfare of the whole of which the thing is a part (bonum suitatis—­bonum communionis).  The second is not only the nobler but also the stronger; this holds of the lower creatures as well as of man, who, when not degenerate, prefers the general welfare to his individual interests.  Love is the highest of the virtues, and is never, as other human endowments, exposed to the danger of excess; therefore the life of action is of more worth than the life of contemplation.  By this principle of morals Bacon marked out the way for the English ethics of later times.[1] He notes the lack of a science of character, for which more material is given in ordinary discourse, in the poets and the historians, than in the works of the philosophers; he explains the power of the affections over the reason by the fact that the idea of present good fills the imagination more forcibly than the idea of good to come, and summons persuasion, habit, and morals to the aid of the latter.  We must endeavor so to govern the passions (each of which combines in itself a masculine impetuosity with a feminine weakness) that they shall take the part of the reason instead of attacking it.  Elsewhere Bacon gives (not entirely unquestionable) directions concerning the art of making one’s way.  Acute observations and ingenious remarks everywhere abound.  In order to inform one’s self of a man’s intentions and ends, it is necessary