as a rule, latent in ordinary consciousness, on whose anticipatory application our experience is based throughout, assert something absolutely incapable of being experienced.  If, in order to the production of a “pure experience,” we eliminate all subjective additions of the understanding contained in experiential thought (all that cannot be present at the moment or locally at hand, in short, all that cannot be the direct object and content of actual observation), this breaks up into an unordered, unconnected aggregate of discontinuous perceptual fragments; in order that a complete and articulated condition of experience may result, these fragments (the purely factual content of observation, the incoherent matter of perception) must be supplemented and connected by very much that is not observed.

[Footnote 1:  R. Falckenberg, Ueber die gegenwaertige Lage der deutschen Philosophie, inaugural address at Erlangen, Leipsic, 1890.]

[Footnote 2:  Wundt:  Essays, 1885, including “Philosophy and Science”; System of Philosophy, 1889.  On the latter cf.  Volkelt’s paper in the Philosophische Monatshefte, vol. xxvii. 1891; and on the Essays a notice by the same author in the same review, vol. xxiii. 1887.]

Further, a reaction against crude naturalism is observable in the practical field, though political economists (Roscher) and jurists take a more active part in it than the philosophers.  Personally R. von Jhering (1818-92; Purpose in Law, 2 vols., 1877-83, 2d ed., 1884-86) stands on idealistic ground, although, rejecting the nativistic and formalistic theory, he is in principle an adherent of “realism,” of the principle of interest and social utility (the moral is that Which is permanently useful to society).

Finally, similar motives underlie the growing interest in the history of philosophy.  The idealistic impulse seeks the nourishment which the un-metaphysical present denies to it from the great works of the past, and hopes, by keeping alive the classical achievements of previous times, to enhance the consciousness of the urgency and irrepressibleness of the highest questions, and to awaken courage for renewed attempts at their solution.  Thus the study of history enters the service of systematic philosophy.

%(c) The Special Philosophical Sciences.%—­The more the courage to attack the central problems of philosophy has been paralyzed by the neo-Kantian theory of knowledge and the coming-in of the positivistic spirit, the more lively has been the work of the last decades in the special departments:  the transfer of the center of gravity from metaphysics to the particular sciences is the most prominent characteristic of the philosophy of the time.  Logic sees century-old convictions shattered and new foundations arising.  Psychology has entered into competition with physiology in regard to the discovery of the laws of the psychical functions which depend on bodily processes, while