phenomena—­space, time, and the categories as “conditions” of experience are functions of a pure consciousness to be presupposed.  The antithesis of subject and object, the soul and the world, first arises in the sphere of phenomena.  The empirical subject, like the world of objects, is itself a product of the a priori forms, hence not that which produces them.  To the transcendental group belong Hermann Cohen[1] in Marburg, A. Stadler[2], Natorp, Lasswitz (p.17), E. Koenig (p. 17), Koppelmann (p. 330), Staudinger (p. 331).  Fritz Schultze of Dresden is also to be counted among the neo-Kantians (Philosophy of Natural Science, 1882; Kant and Darwin, 1875; The Fundamental Thoughts of Materialism, 1881; The Fundamental Thoughts of Spiritualism, 1883; Comparative Psychology, i. 1, 1892).

[Footnote 1:  Cohen:  Kant’s Theory of Experience, 1871, 2d ed., 1886; Kant’s Foundation of Ethics, 1877; Kant’s Foundation of Aesthetics, 1889.]

[Footnote 2:  Stadler:  Kant’s Teleology, 1874; The Principles of the Pure Theory of Knowledge in the Kantian Philosophy, 1876; Kant’s Theory of Matter, 1883.]

The German positivists[1]:—­E.  Laas of Strasburg (1837-85), A. Riehl of Freiburg in Baden (born 1844), and R. Avenarius of Zurich (born 1843)—­develop their sensationalistic theory of knowledge in critical connection with Kant.  Ernst Laas defines positivism (founded by Protagoras, advocated in modern times by Hume and J.S.  Mill, and hostile to Platonic idealism) as that philosophy which recognizes no other foundations than positive facts (i.e., perceptions), and requires every opinion to exhibit the experiences on which it rests.  Its basis is constituted by three articles of belief:  (1) The correlative facts, subject and object, exist and arise only in connection (objects are directly known only as the contents of a consciousness, cui objecta sunt, subjects only as centers of relation, as the scene or foundation of a representative content, cui subjecta sunt:  outside my thoughts body does not exist as body, nor I myself as soul). (2) The variability of the objects of perception. (3) Sensationalism—­all specific differences in consciousness must be conceived as differences in degree, all higher mental processes and states, including thought, as the perceptions and experiences, transformed according to law, of beings which feel, have wants, possess memory, and are capable of spontaneous motion.  The subject coincides with its feeling of pleasure and pain, from which sensation is distinguished by its objective content.  The illusions of metaphysics are scientifically untenable and practically unnecessary.  Various yearnings, wants, presentiments, hopes, and fancies, it is true, lead beyond the sphere of that which can be checked by sense and experience, but for none of their positions can any sufficient proof be adduced.  As physics