progress.  These are still wanting in the mental sciences, in which the often answered but never decided questions continually recur, because we have neither derived the principles chosen as the basis of the deduction from an exact knowledge of the phenomena nor tested the results by experience.  The causes of this defective condition can only be removed by imitating the study of nature:  we must learn that no conclusions can be reached except from facts, and that we are to strive after knowledge of phenomena and their laws alone.  We have no right to assume an “essence” of things beside and in addition to phenomena, which reveals itself in them or hides behind them.  Pupils of Opzoomer are his successor in his Utrecht chair, Van der Wyck, and Pierson.  We may also mention J.P.N.  Land, who has done good service in editing the works of Spinoza and of Geulincx, and the philosopher of religion Rauwenhoff (1888).

[Footnote 1:  Opzoomer:  The Method of Science, a Handbook of Logic, German translation by Schwindt, 1852; Religion, German translation by Mook, 1869.]

On the system of the Hungarian philosopher Cyrill Horvath (died 1884 at Pesth) see the essay by E. Nemes in the Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie, vol. lxxxviii, 1886.  Since 1889 a review, Problems of Philosophy and Psychology, has appeared at Moscow in Russian, under the direction of Professor N. von Grot.

CHAPTER XVI.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY SINCE THE DEATH OF HEGEL.

With Hegel the glorious dynasty which, with a strong hand, had guided the fate of German philosophy since the conclusion of the preceding century disappears.  From his death (1831) we may date the second period of post-Kantian philosophy,[1] which is markedly and unfavorably distinguished from the first by a decline in the power of speculative creation and by a division of effort.  If previous to this the philosophical public, comprising all the cultured, had been eagerly occupied with problems in common, and had followed with unanimous interest the work of those who were laboring at them, during the last fifty years the interest of wider circles in philosophical questions has grown much less active; almost every thinker goes his own way, giving heed only to congenial voices; the inner connection of the schools has been broken down; the touch with thinkers of different views has been lost.  The latest decades have been the first to bring a change for the better, in so far as new rallying points of philosophical interest have been created by the neo-Kantian movement, by the systems of Lotze and Von Hartmann, by the impulse toward the philosophy of nature proceeding from Darwinism, by energetic labors in the field of practical philosophy, and by new methods of investigation in psychology.