no evil on thyself or others from which a balance of good will not result.  The end of morality is the “greatest happiness of the greatest number,” in the production of which each has first to care for his own welfare:  whoever injures himself more than he serves others acts immorally, for he diminishes the sum of happiness in the world; the interest of the individual coincides with the interest of society.  The two classes of virtues are prudence and benevolence.  The latter is a natural, though not a disinterested affection:  happiness enjoyed with others is greater than happiness enjoyed alone.  Love is a pleasure-giving extension of the individual; we serve others to be served by them.

[Footnote 1:  Bentham:  Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789; new ed., 1823, reprinted 1876; Deontology, 1834, edited by Bowring, who also edited the Works, 1838-43. The Principles of Civil and Criminal Legislation, edited in French from Bentham’s manuscripts by his pupil Etienne Dumont (1801, 2d ed., 1820; English by Hildreth, 5th ed., 1887), was translated into German with notes by F.E.  Beneke, 1830.]

Associationalism has been reasserted by James Mill (1773-1836; Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 1829), whose influence lives on in the work of his greater son.  The latter, John Stuart Mill,[1] was born in London 1806, and was from 1823 to 1858 a secretary in the India House; after the death of his wife he lived (with the exception of two years of service as a Member of Parliament) at Avignon; his death occurred in 1873.  Mill’s System of Logic appeared in 1843, 9th ed., 1875; his Utilitarianism, 1863, new ed., 1871; An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, 1865, 5th ed., 1878; his notes to the new edition of his father’s work, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2d ed., 1878, also deserve notice.  With the phenomenalism of Hume and the (somewhat corrected) associational psychology of his father as a basis, Mill makes experience the sole source of knowledge, rejecting a priori and intuitive elements of every sort.  Matter he defines as a “permanent possibility of sensation”; mind is resolved into “a series of feelings with a background of possibilities of feeling,” even though the author is not unaware of the difficulty involved in the question how a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series.  Mathematical principles, like all others, have an experiential origin—­the peculiar certitude ascribed to them by the Kantians is a fiction—­and induction is the only fruitful method of scientific inquiry (even in mental science).  The syllogism is itself a concealed induction.