its peculiar nature being in both cases overlooked.  In opposition to the sensualization of aesthetic appreciation, its character as judgment must be maintained; and in opposition to its rationalization, its character as feeling.  This relation of the Kantian aesthetics to that of his predecessors explains both its fundamental tendency and the elements in it which appear defective and erroneous.  In any case, Kant shows himself in this field also an unapproachable master of careful analysis.

The first task of aesthetics is the careful distinction of its object from related phenomena.  The beautiful has points of contact with the agreeable, the good, the perfect, the useful, and the true.  It is distinguished from the true by the fact that it is not an object of knowledge, but of satisfaction.  If we inquire further into the difference between the satisfaction in the beautiful and the satisfaction in the agreeable, in the good (in itself), and in the (good for something, as a means, or in the) useful, which latter three have this in common, that they are objects of appetition—­of sensuous want, of moral will, of prudential desire—­it becomes evident that the beautiful pleases through its mere representation (that is, independently of the real existence of the object), and that the delight in the beautiful is a contemplative pleasure.  It is for contemplation only, not to be sensuously enjoyed nor put to practical use; and, further, its production is not a universal duty.  Sensuous, prudential, or moral appetition has always an “interest” in the actual existence of the object; the beautiful, on the other hand, calls forth a disinterested satisfaction.

According to quality the beautiful is the object of a disinterested, free (bound by no interest), and sportive satisfaction.  According to quantity and modality the judgment of taste claims universal and necessary validity, without this being based upon concepts.  This posits further differences between the beautiful and the agreeable and the good.  The good also pleases universally, but it pleases through concepts; the agreeable as well as the beautiful pleases without a concept, but it does not please universally.

That which pleases the reason through the concept is good; that which pleases the senses in sensation is agreeable.  That which pleases universally and necessarily without a concept is beautiful.  Moral judgment demands the assent of all, and its universal validity is demonstrable.  The judgment concerning the agreeable is not capable of demonstration, but neither does it pretend to possess universal validity; we readily acknowledge that what is pleasant to one need not be so to every other man.  In regard to the beautiful, on the contrary, we do not content ourselves with saying that tastes differ, but we expect it to please all.  We expect everyone to assent to our judgment of taste, although it is able to support itself by no proofs.