can only be attained by conquering the sensuous impulses, therefore the moral law speaks to us in the form of an “ought,” of an imperative.) Among the laws of the will or imperatives, also, there are some which possess the character of absolute necessity and universality, and which, consequently, are a priori.  As the understanding dictates laws to the phenomenal world, so practical reason gives a law to itself, is autonomous; and as the a priori laws of nature relate only to the form of the objects of experience, so the moral law determines not the content, but only the form of volition:  “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”  The law of practical reason is a “categorical imperative.”  What does this designation mean, and what is the basis of the formula of the moral law which has just been given?

Practical principles are either subjectively valid, in which case they are termed maxims (volitional principles of the individual), or objectively valid, when they are called imperatives or precepts.  The latter are either valid under certain conditions (If you wish to become a clergyman you must study theology; he who would prosper as a merchant must not cheat his customers), or unconditionally valid (Thou shalt not lie).  All prudential or technical rules are hypothetical imperatives, the moral law is a categorical imperative.  The injunction to be truthful is not connected with the condition that we intend to act morally, but this general purpose, together with all the special purposes belonging to it, to avoid lying, etc., is demanded unconditionally and of everyone—­as surely as we are rational beings we are under moral obligation, not in order to reputation here below and happiness above, but without all “ifs” and “in order to’s.”  Thou shalt unconditionally, whatever be the outcome.  And as the moral law is independent of every end to be attained, so it suffers neither increase nor diminution in its binding force, whether men obey it or not.  It has absolute authority, no matter whether it is fulfilled frequently or seldom, nay, whether it is fulfilled anywhere or at any time whatsoever in the world!

There is an important difference between the good which we are under obligation to do and the evil which we are under obligation not to do, and the goods and ills which we seek and avoid.  The goods are always relatively good only, good for something—­as means to ends—­and a bad use can be made of all that nature and fortune give us as well as a good one.  That which duty commands is an end in itself, in itself good, absolutely worthful, and no misuse of it is possible.  It might be supposed that pleasure, that happiness is an ultimate end.  But men have very different opinions in regard to what is pleasant, one holding one thing pleasurable and another another.  It is impossible to discover by empirical methods what duty demands of all men