further determination of this being impossible), or (in the dogmatic sense) anthropomorphic.  Theism is entirely possible apart from a mistaken anthropomorphism, in so far as through the predicates which we take from inner experience (understanding and will) we do not determine the concept of God as he is in himself, but only analogically[2] in his relation to the world.  That concept serves only to aid us in our contemplation of the world,[3] not as a means of knowing the Supreme Being himself.  For speculative purposes it remains a mere ideal, yet a perfectly faultless one, which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge.

[Footnote 1:  “They need favor to supply their lack of legitimate claims.”  Of themselves alone, therefore, they are unable to yield any theological knowledge, but they are fitted to prepare the understanding for it, and to give emphasis to other possible (moral) proofs.]

[Footnote 2:  We halt at the boundary of the legitimate use of reason, without overstepping it, when we limit our judgment to the relation of the world to the Supreme Being, and in this allow ourselves a symbolical anthropomorphism only, which in reality has reference to our language alone and not to the object.]

[Footnote 3:  We are compelled to look on the world as if it were the work of a supreme intelligence and will.  “We may confidently derive the phenomena of the world and their existence from other (phenomena), as if no necessary being existed, and yet unceasingly strive after completeness in the derivation, as though such a being were presupposed as a supreme ground.”  In short, physical (mechanical) explanation, and a theistic point of view or teleological judgment.]

Thus the value of the Ideas is twofold.  By showing the untenable ness of atheism, fatalism, and naturalism, they I clear the way for the objects of faith.  By providing natural science with the standpoint of a systematical unity through teleological connection, they make an extension of the use of the understanding possible within the realm of experience,[1] though not beyond it.  The systematic development of the Kantian teleology, which is here indicated in general outlines only, is found in the second part of the Critique of Judgment; while the practical philosophy, which furnishes the only possible proof, the moral proof, for the reality of the Ideas, erects on the site left free by the removal of the airy summer-houses of dogmatic metaphysics the solid mansion of critical metaphysics, that is, the metaphysics of duties and of hopes.  “I was obliged to destroy knowledge in order to make room for faith.”  The transition from the impossible theoretical or speculative knowledge of things in themselves to the possible “practical knowledge” of them (the belief that there is a God and a future world) is given in the Doctrine of Method, which is divided into four parts (the Discipline, the Canon, the Architectonic, and the History of Pure Reason), in its second chapter.  There, in the ideal of the Summum Bonum, the proof is brought forward for the validity of the Ideas God, freedom, and immortality, as postulates inseparable from moral obligation; and by a cautious investigation of the three stages of assent (opinion, knowledge, and belief) both doctrinal and moral belief are assigned their places in the system of the kinds of knowledge.