reveals only the deceptive exterior of things, while reason gives their true non-sensuous essence.  That which the mind perceives of things is deceptive, but that which it thinks concerning them is true.  The former power is the faculty of confused, the latter the faculty of distinct knowledge.  Sense is the enemy rather than the servant of true knowledge, which consists in the development and explication of pregnant innate conceptions and principles.  These philosophers forget that we can never reach reality by conceptual analysis; and that the senses have a far greater importance for knowledge than merely to give it an impulse; that it is they which supply the understanding with real objects, and so with the content of knowledge.  Beside the (formal) activity (of the understanding), cognition implies a passive factor, a reception of impressions.  Neither sense alone nor the understanding alone produces knowledge, but both cognitive powers are necessary, the active and the passive, the conceptual and the intuitive.  Here the question arises, How do concept and intuition, sensuous and rational knowledge, differ, and what is the basis of their congruence?  Notwithstanding their different points of departure and their variant results, the two main tendencies of modern philosophy agree in certain points.  If the conflict between the two schools and their one-sidedness suggested the idea of supplementing the conclusions of the one by those of the other, the recognition of the incorrectness of their common convictions furnished the occasion to go beyond them and to establish a new, a higher point of view above them both, as also above the eclecticism which sought to unite the opposing principles.  The errors common to both concern, in the first place, the nature of judgment and the difference between sensibility and understanding.  Neither side had recognized that the peculiar character of judgment consists in active connection.  The rationalists made judgment an active function, it is true, but a mere activity of conscious development, of elucidation and analytical inference, which does not advance knowledge a single step.  The empiricists described it as a process of comparison and discrimination, as the mere perception and recognition of the relations and connections already existing between ideas; while in reality judgment does not discover the relations and connections of representations, but itself establishes them.  In the former case the synthetic moment is ignored, in the latter the active moment.  The imperfect view of judgment was one of the reasons for the appearance of extreme theories concerning the origin of ideas in reason or in perception.  Rationalism regards even those concepts which have a content as innate, whereas it is only formal concepts which are so.  Empiricism regards all, even the highest formal concepts (the categories), as abstracted from experience, whereas experience furnishes only the content of knowledge, and not the synthesis which is necessary