grounded in the being’s own nature, not an external compulsion.  The agent determines himself in accordance with his own nature, and for this each bears the responsibility himself, for God, when he brought the monads out of possibility into actuality, left their natures as they had existed before the creation in the form of eternal ideas in His understanding.  Though Leibnitz thus draws a distinction between his deterministic doctrine and the “fatalism” of Spinoza, he recognizes a second concept of freedom, which completely corresponds to Spinoza’s.  A decision is the more free the more distinct the ideas which determine it, and a man the more free the more he withdraws his will from the influence of the passions, i.e., confused ideas, and subordinates it to that of reason.  God alone is absolutely free, because he has no ideas which are not distinct.  The bridge between the two conceptions of freedom is established by the principle that reason constitutes the peculiar nature of man in a higher degree than the sum of his ideas; for it is reason which distinguishes him from the lower beings.  According to the first meaning of freedom man is free, according to the second, which coincides with activity, perfection, and morality, he should become free.

Morality is the result of the natural development of the individual.  Every being strives after perfection or increased activity, i.e., after more distinct ideas.  Parallel to this theoretical advance runs a practical advance in a twofold form:  the increasing distinctness of ideas, or enlightenment, or wisdom, raises the impulse to transitory, sensuous pleasure into an impulse to permanent delight in our spiritual perfection, or toward happiness, while, further, it opens up an insight into the connection of all beings and the harmony of the world, in virtue of which the virtuous man will seek to promote the perfection and happiness of others as well as his own, i.e., will love them, for to love is to find pleasure in the happiness of others.  To promote the good of all, again, is the same as to contribute one’s share to the world-harmony and to co-operate in the fulfillment of God’s purposes.  Probity and piety are the same.  They form the highest of the three grades of natural right, which Leibnitz distinguishes as jus strictum (mere right, with the principle:  Injure no one), aequitas (equity or charity, with the maxim:  To each his due), and probitas sive pietas (honorableness joined with religion, according to the command:  Lead an upright and morally pure life).  They may also be designated as commutative, distributive, and universal justice.  Belief in God and immortality is a condition of the last.

%4.  Theology and Theodicy.%