their relation to our state of mind.  When we speak of a victory of reason over passion it is nothing but a conquest of one passion by another, i. e., of a violent passion by a calm one.  That which is commonly called reason here is nothing but one of those general and calm affections (e. g., the love of life) which direct the will to a distant good, without exciting any sensible emotion in the mind; by passion we commonly understand the violent passions only, which engender a marked disturbance in the soul and the production of which requires a certain propinquity of the object.  A man is said to be industrious “from reason,” when a calm desire for money makes him laborious.  It is a mistake to consider all violent passions powerful, and all calm ones weak.  The prevalence of calm affections constitutes the essence of strength of mind.

As reason is thus degraded from a governor of the will to a “slave of the passions,” so, further, judgment concerning right and wrong is taken away from her.  Moral distinctions are determined by our sense of the agreeable and the disagreeable.  We pass an immediate judgment of taste on the actions of our fellow-men; the good pleases, evil displeases.  The sight of virtue gives us satisfaction; that of vice repels us.  Accordingly an action or trait of mind is virtuous when it calls forth in the observer an agreeable, disinterested sentiment of approbation.

What, then, are the actions which receive such general approval, and how is the praise to be explained which the spectator bestows on them?  We approve such traits of character as are immediately agreeable or useful, either to the person himself or to others.  This yields four classes of praiseworthy qualities.  The first class, those which are agreeable to the possessor (quite apart from any utility to himself or to others), includes cheerfulness, greatness of mind, courage, tranquillity, and benevolence; the second, those immediately agreeable to others, modesty, good manners, politeness, and wit; the third, those useful to ourselves, strength of will, industry, frugality, strength of body, intelligence and other mental gifts.  The fourth class comprises the highest virtues, the qualities useful to others, benevolence and justice.  Pleasure and utility are in all cases the criterion of merit.  The monkish virtues of humility and mortification of the flesh, which bring no pleasure or advantage either to their possessor or to society, are considered meritorious by no one who understands the subject.

If the moral value of actions is thus made to depend on their effects, we cannot dispense with the assistance of reason in judging moral questions, since it alone can inform us concerning these results of action.  Reason, however, is not sufficient to determine us to praise or blame.  Nothing but a sentiment can induce us to give the preference to beneficial and useful tendencies over pernicious ones.  This feeling is evidently no other than satisfaction in