him contented with himself and acceptable to God and man, but great states require stronger motives to labor and industry in order to be prosperous.  A people among whom frugality, self-denial, and quietness of spirit were the rule would remain poor and ignorant.  Besides holding that virtue furthers the happiness of society, Shaftesbury makes a second mistake in assuming that human nature includes unselfish inclinations.  It is not innate love and goodness that make us social, but our passions and weaknesses (above all, fear); man is by nature self-seeking.  All actions, including the so-called virtues, spring from vanity and egoism; thus it has always been, thus it is in every grade of society.  In social life, indeed, we dare not display all these desires openly, nor satisfy them at will.  Shrewd lawgivers have taught men to conceal their natural passions and to limit them by artificial ones, persuading them that renunciation is true happiness, on the ground that through it we attain the supreme good—­reputation among, and the esteem of our fellows.  Since then honor and shame have become the strongest motives and have incited men to that which is called virtue, i.e., to actions which apparently imply the sacrifice of selfish inclinations for the good of society, while they are really done out of pride and self-love.  By constantly feigning noble sentiments before others man comes, finally, to deceive himself, believing himself a being whose happiness consists in the renunciation of self and all that is earthly, and in the thought of his moral excellence.—­The crass assumptions in Mandeville’s reasoning are evident at a glance.  After analyzing virtue into the suppression of desire, after labeling the impulse after moral approbation vanity, lawful self-love egoism, and rational acquisitiveness avarice, it was easy for him to prove that it is vice which makes the individual industrious and the state prosperous, that virtue is seldom found, and that if it were universal it would become injurious to society.

With different shading and with less one-sidedness, Bolingbroke (cf. p. 193) defended the standpoint of naturalism.  God has created us for happiness in common; we are destined to assist one another.  Happiness is attainable in society alone, and society cannot exist without justice and benevolence.  He who exercises virtue, i.e., promotes the good of the species, promotes at the same time his own good.  All actions spring from self-love, which, guided at first by an immediate instinct, and later, by reason developed through experience, extends itself over ever widening spheres.  We love ourselves in our relatives, in our friends, further still, in our country, finally, in humanity, so that self-love and social love coincide, and we are impelled to virtue by the combined motives of interest and duty.  This is an ethic of common sense from the standpoint of the cultured man of the world—­which at the proper time has the right, no doubt, to gain itself a hearing.