I am often told, in half-defence of what they have done, that the Germans are conducting the war in a strictly logical manner.  At first, I must admit, I was rather taken with the idea, and, indeed, one felt almost sorry for a noble nation sacrificing its feelings on the uncompromising altar of Logic.  For the object of war is obviously to defeat your enemy, and it may be argued that anything which will accelerate that result is not only justifiable, but almost humane, for it will shorten the unavoidable horrors of war.  I should like to mention a few of the features of logical warfare, all of which have at one time or another been adopted by our opponents, and I shall then describe as far as I can an example which I myself saw.

When an army wishes to pass through a country, the civil population is in the way.  To get rid of them, the best plan, and the quickest, is to annihilate the first town of a suitable size to which the army comes.  If the town is wiped out, and men, women, and children slaughtered indiscriminately, it will make such an impression in the rest of the country that the whole population will clear out and there will be no further trouble.  The country will then be free for the passage of troops, and there will be no troublesome civil population to feed or govern.  The conduct of the war will be greatly facilitated.  Of course, it will be necessary at intervals to repeat the process, but this presents the further advantage that it advertises to other nations what they may expect if war enters their borders.  This, one of the most elementary rules of logical warfare, has been strictly observed by Germany.  The sack of Louvain and the slaughter of its inhabitants met with an immediate success.  Wherever the German army arrived, they entered with few exceptions empty towns.  Termonde, Malines, Antwerp, had everything swept and garnished for their reception.  It would, of course, be absurdly illogical to confine one’s attack to persons capable of defence.  To kill a hundred women and children makes far more impression than to kill a thousand men, and it is far safer, unless, of course, it is preferred to use them as a screen to protect your own advancing troops from the enemy’s fire.

It is a mistake to burden your transport with the enemy’s wounded, or, indeed—­low be it spoken—­with your own.  The former should always be killed, and the latter so far as the degree of culture of your country will allow.  It is one of the regrettable points, logically, of Germany’s warfare that she appears to pay some attention to her wounded, but our information on this point is deficient, and it is possible that she limits it to those who may again be useful.

To kill the Medical Staff of the enemy is obviously most desirable.  Without them a large number of the wounded would die.  If, therefore, it is possible to kill both the doctors and the wounded together, it is a great advantage, and of all possible objectives for artillery a hospital is the most valuable.  So complete was our confidence in the German observance of this rule that when we heard that they were likely to bombard Antwerp, we were strongly advised to remove our Red Cross from the sight of prying aeroplanes, and we took the advice.  Several other hospitals were hit, but we escaped.