in deliberating upon the future, and how they ought
to have a bearing upon utility, or a power of producing
effects, a man who is arguing upon a fact is bound
to collect, so as to show that they must have been
useful to the man whom he is accusing, and that the
act might possibly have been done by him. The
question of utility, as far as it depends upon conjecture,
is opened, if the accused person is said to have done
the act of which he is accused, either out of the
hope of advantage or the fear of injury. And
this argument has the greater weight, the greater the
advantages or disadvantages anticipated are said to
be. With reference to the motive for an action
we take into consideration also the feelings of minds,
if any recent anger, or long-standing grudge, or desire
for revenge, or indignation at an injury; if any eagerness
for honour, or glory, or command, or riches; if any
fear of danger, any debt, any difficulties in pecuniary
matters, have had influence; if the man is bold, or
fickle, or cruel, or intemperate, or incautious, or
foolish, or loving, or excitable, or given to wine;
if he had any hope of gaining his point, or any expectation
of concealing his conduct; or, if that were detected,
any hope of repelling the charge, or breaking through
the danger, or even postponing it to a subsequent time;
or if the penalty to be inflicted by a court of justice
is more trifling than the prize to be gained by the
act; or if the pleasure of the crime is greater than
the pain of the conviction.
It is generally by such circumstances as these that
the suspicion of an act is confirmed, when the causes
why he should have desired it are found to exist in
the party accused, together with the means of doing
it. But in his will we look for the benefit which
he may have calculated on from the attainment of some
advantage, or the avoidance of some disadvantage,
so that either hope or fear may seem to have instigated
him, or else some sudden impulse of the mind, which
impels men more swiftly to evil courses than even
considerations of utility. So this is enough
to have said about the causes.
C.F. I understand; and I ask you now what the
events are which you have said are produced by such
causes?
XXXIII. C.P. They are certain consequential
signs of what is past, certain traces of what has
been done, deeply imprinted, which have a great tendency
to engender suspicion, and are, as it were, a silent
evidence of crimes, and so much the more weighty because
all causes appear as a general rule to be able to
give ground for accusations, and to show for whose
advantage anything was; and these arguments have an
especial propriety of reference to those who are accused,
such as a weapon, a footstep, blood, the detection
of anything which appears to have been carried off
or taken away; or any reply inconsistent with the
truth, or any hesitation, or trepidation, or the fact
of the accused person having been seen with any one