XXX.  But from the meeting and conflict, as it were, of the reasons and of the corroborative proofs, a question arises, which I call a dispute, in which the question is, what is the question before the court, and what the dispute is about.  For the first point which the adversaries contend for implies an inquiry of large extent in conjecture:  as “Whether Decius has received the money;” in definition, as “Whether Norbanus has committed treason against the people;” in justice, as “Whether Opimius slew Gracchus lawfully.”  These questions which come into conflict first by arguing and resisting, are, as I have said, of wide extent and doubtful meaning.  The comparison of the arguments and corroborative proofs narrows the question in dispute.  In conjecture there is no dispute at all.  For no one either can, or ought to, or is accustomed to, give a reason for an act which he asserts never took place.  Therefore, in these causes the original question and the ultimate dispute are one and the same thing.  But in them, when the assertion is advanced, “He did not commit treason in proceeding to violent measures in respect to Caepio; for it was the first indignation of the Roman people that prompted that violent conduct, and not the conduct of the tribune:  and the majesty, since it is identical with the greatness of the Roman people, was rather increased than diminished by retaining that man in power and office.”  And when the reply is, “Majesty consists of the dignity of the empire and name of the Roman people, which that man impairs, who excites sedition by appealing to the violent passions of the multitude;” then comes the dispute, Whether his conduct was calculated to impair that majesty, who acted upon the inclinations of the roman people, so as to do a thing which was both just and acceptable to them by means of violence.  But in such causes as these, when it is alleged in defence of the accused party that something has been rightly done, or when it must be admitted that it has been done, while the principle of the act is open to discussion:  as in the case of Opimius, “I did it lawfully, for the sake of preserving the general safety and the republic;” and when Decius replies, “You had no power or right to slay even the wickedest of the citizens without a trial.”  Then arises the dispute, “Had Opimius lawfully the power, for the sake of the safety of the republic, to put to death a citizen who was overturning the republic, without his being condemned?” And so those disputes which arise in these controversies which are marked out by certain persons and times become gradually infinite, and after the times and persons are put out of the question, are again reduced to the form and rules under which their merits can be discussed.