C.  P. In deliberation, then, the end aimed at is utility, to which everything is referred in giving counsel, and in delivering our sentiments, so that the first thing which requires to be noticed by any one who is advising or dissuading from such and such a course of action is what is possible to be done, or what is impossible; or what is necessary to be done, or what is unnecessary.  For if a thing be impossible there is no use in deliberating about it, however desirable it may be; and if a thing be necessary, (when I say necessary, I mean such that without it we cannot be safe or free), then that must be preferred to everything else which is either honourable or advantageous in public affairs.  But when the question is, What can be done? we must also consider how easily it can be done:  for the things which are very difficult are often to be considered in the same light as if they were totally impossible.  And when we are discussing necessity, although there may be something which is not absolutely necessary, still we must consider of how much importance it is.  For that which is of very great importance indeed, is often considered necessary.  Therefore, as this kind of cause consists of persuasion and dissuasion, the speaker who is trying to persuade, has a simple course before him; if a thing is both advantageous and possible, let it be done.  The speaker who is trying to dissuade his hearers from some course of action, has a twofold division of his labour.  One, if it is not useful it must not be done; the other, if it is impossible it must not be undertaken.  And so, the speaker who is trying to persuade must establish both these points; the one whose object it is to dissuade, may be content with invalidating either.

Since, then, all deliberation turns on these two points, let us first speak of utility, which is conversant about the distinction between advantages and disadvantages.  But of advantages, some are necessarily such; as life, chastity, liberty, or as children, wives, relations, parents; and some are not necessarily such; and of these last, some are to be sought for their own sakes, as those which are classed among the duties or virtues, and others are to be desired because they produce some advantage, as riches and influence.  But of those advantages which are sought for their own sake, some are sought for their honourableness, some for their convenience, which is inherent in them:  those are sought for their honourableness which proceed from those virtues which have been mentioned a little while ago, which are intrinsically praiseworthy on their own account; but those are sought on account of some inherent advantage which are desirable as to goods of fortune or of the body:  some of which are to a certain extent combined with honourableness, as honour, and glory; some have no connexion with that, as strength, beauty, health, nobleness, riches, troops of dependents.  There is also a certain sort of matter, as it were, which is subordinate to