The power of virtue then is twofold, for virtue is distinguished either by theory or by practice.  For that which is called prudence, or shrewdness, or (if we must have the most dignified title for it) wisdom, is all theoretical.  But that which is praised as regulating the passions, and restraining the feelings of the mind, finds its exercise in practice.  And its name is temperance.  And prudence when exerted in a man’s own business is called domestic, when displayed in the affairs of the state is called civil prudence.  But temperance in like manner is divided according to its sphere of action, whether displayed in a man’s own affairs, or in those of the state.  And it is discerned in two ways with respect to advantages, both by not desiring what it has not got, and by abstaining from what it is in its power to get.  Again, in the case of disadvantages it is also twofold; for that quality which resists impending evils is called fortitude; that which bears and endures the evil that is present is termed patience.  And that which embraces these two qualities is called magnanimity.  And one of the forms of this virtue is shown in the use of money.  And at the same time loftiness of spirit in supporting disadvantages, and especially injuries, and everything of the sort, being grave, sedate, and never turbulent.  But that division of virtue which is exercised between one being and another is called justice.  And that when exercised towards the gods is called religion; towards one’s relations, affection; towards all the world, goodness; when displayed in things entrusted to one, good faith; as exhibited in moderation of punishment, lenity; when it develops itself in goodwill towards an individual its name is friendship.

XXIII.  And all these virtues are visible in practice.  But there are others, which are as it were the handmaidens and companions of wisdom; one of which distinguishes between and decides what arguments in a discussion are true or false, and what follows from what premises.  And this virtue is wholly placed in the system and theory of arguing; but the other virtue belongs to the orator.  For eloquence is nothing but wisdom speaking with great copiousness; and while derived from the same source as that which is displayed in disputing, is more rich, and of wider application, better suited to excite the minds of men and to work on the feelings of the common people.  But the guardian of all the virtues, which avoids all conspicuousness, and yet attains the greatest eminence of praise, is modesty.  And these are for the most part certain habits of mind, so affected and disposed as to be each of them distinguished from one another by some peculiar kind of virtue; and according as everything is done by one of them, in the same proportion must it be honourable and in the highest degree praiseworthy.  But there are other habits also of a well-instructed mind which has been cultivated beforehand as it were, and prepared for virtue by virtuous pursuits and accomplishments: