XVII.  But in some of these causes there is a uniform operation, and in others there is not.  In nature and in art there is uniformity; but in the others there is none.  But still of those causes which are not uniform, some are evident, others are concealed.  Those are evident which touch the desire or judgment of the mind; those are concealed which are subject to fortune:  for as nothing is done without some cause, this very obscure cause, which works in a concealed manner, is the issue of fortune.  Again, these results which are produced are partly unintended, partly intentional.  Those are unintended which are produced by necessity; those are intentional which are produced by design.  But those results which are produced by fortune are either unintended or intentional.  For to shoot an arrow is an act of intention; to hit a man whom you did not mean to hit is the result of fortune.  And this is the topic which you use like a battering-ram in your forensic pleadings; if a weapon has flown from the man’s hand rather than been thrown by him.  Also agitation of mind may be divided into absence of knowledge and absence of intention.  And although they are to a certain extent voluntary, (for they are diverted from their course by reproof or by admonition,) still they are liable to such emotions that even those acts of theirs which are intentional sometimes seem either unavoidable, or at all events unintentional.

The whole topic of these causes then being now fully explained, from their differences there is derived a great abundance of arguments in all the important discussions of orators and philosophers.  And in the cases which you lawyers argue, if there is not so plentiful a stock, what there are, are perhaps more subtle and shrewd.  For in private actions the decisions in the most important cases appear to me to depend a great deal on the acuteness of the lawyers.  For they are constantly present, and are taken into counsel; and they supply weapons to able advocates whenever they have recourse to their professional wisdom.

In all those judicial proceedings then, in which the words “according to good faith” are added, or even those words, “as ought to be done by one good man to another;” and above all, in all cases of arbitration respecting matrimonial rights, in which the words “juster and better” occur, the lawyers ought to be always ready.  For they know what “dishonest fraud,” or “good faith,” or “just,” or “good” mean.  They are acquainted with the law between partners; they know what the man who has the management of the affairs of another is bound to do with respect to him whose affairs he manages; they have laid down rules to show what the man who has committed a charge to another, and what he who has had it committed to him, ought to do; what a husband ought to confer on his wife, and a wife on her husband.  It will, therefore, when they have by diligence arrived at a proper understanding of the topics from which the necessary arguments are derived, be in the power not only of orators and philosophers, but of lawyers also, to discuss with abundance of argument all the questions which can arise for their consideration.