The next topic is one which is derived from contraries.  But the genera of contraries are several.  One is of such things as differ in the same kind; as wisdom and jolly.  But those things are said to be in the same kind, which, when they are proposed, are immediately met by certain contraries, as if placed opposite to them:  as slowness is contrary to rapidity, and not weakness.  From which contraries such arguments as these are deduced:—­“If we avoid folly, let us pursue wisdom; and if we avoid wickedness, let us pursue goodness.”  These things, as they are contrary qualities in the same class, are called opposites.  For there are other contraries, which we may call in Latin, privantia, and which the Greeks call [Greek:  steraetika].  For the preposition in deprives the word of that force which it would have if in were not prefixed; as, “dignity, indignity—­humanity, inhumanity,” and other words of the same kind, the manner of dealing with which is the same as that of dealing with other kinds which I have called opposites.  For there are also other kinds or contraries; as those which are compared to something or other; as, “twofold and simple; many and few; long and short; greater and less.”  There are also those very contrary things which are called negatives, which the Greeks call [Greek:  steraetika]:  as, “If this is the case, that is not.”  For what need is there for an instance? only let it be understood that in seeking for an argument it is not every contrary which is suitable to be opposed to another.

XII.  But I gave a little while ago an instance drawn from adjuncts; showing that many things are added as accessories, which ought to be admitted, if we decided that possession ought to be given by the praetor’s edict, in compliance with the will which that person made who had no right whatever to make a will.  But this topic has more influence in conjectural causes, which are frequent in courts, of justice, when we are inquiring either what is, or what has been, or what is likely to be, or what possibly may happen.  And the form of the topic itself is as follows.  But this topic reminds us to inquire what happened before the transaction of which we are speaking, or at the same time with the transaction, or after the transaction.  “This has nothing to do with the law, you had better apply to Cicero,” our friend Gallus used to say, if any one brought him any cause which required an inquiry into matters of fact.  But you will prefer that no topic of the art which I have begun to treat of should be omitted by me, lest if you should think that nothing was to be written here except what had reference to yourself, you should seem to be too selfish.  This then is for the most part an oratorical topic; not only not much suited to lawyers, but not even to philosophers.  For the circumstances which happened before the matter in question are inquired into, such as any preparation, any conferences, any