money belonging to the dead can be possessed in many ways without inheritance.  Add one word, “lawfully.”  By this time the matter will appear distinguished from general terms, so that the definition may stand thus:—­“An inheritance is money which by somebody’s death has lawfully come to some one else.”  It is not enough yet.  Add, “without being either bequeathed by will, or held as some one else’s property.”  The definition is complete.  Again, take this:—­“Those are gentiles who are of the same name as one another.”  That is insufficient.  “And who are born of noble blood.”  Even that is not enough.  “Who have never had any ancestor in the condition of a slave.”  Something is still wanting.  “Who have never parted with their franchise.”  This, perhaps, may do.  For I am not aware that Scaevola, the pontiff, added anything to this definition.  And this principle holds good in each kind of definition, whether the thing to be defined is something which exists, or something which is understood.

VII.  But we have shown now what is meant by partition, and by division.  But it is necessary to explain more clearly wherein they differ.  In partition, there are as it were members; as of a body—­head, shoulders, hands, sides, legs, feet, and so on.  In division there are forms which the Greeks call [Greek:  ideae]; our countrymen who treat of such subjects call them species.  And it is not a bad name, though it is an inconvenient one if we want to use it in different cases.  For even if it were Latin to use such words, I should not like to say specierum and speciebus.  And we have often occasion to use these cases.  But I have no such objection to saying formarum and formis; and as the meaning of each word is the same, I do not think that convenience of sound is wholly to be neglected.

Men define genus and species or form in this manner:—­“Genus is a notion relating to many differences.  Species is a notion, the difference of which can be referred to the head and as it were fountain of the genus.”  I mean by notion that which the Greeks call sometimes [Greek:  ennoia], and sometimes [Greek:  enoprolaepsis].  It is knowledge implanted and previously acquired of each separate thing, but one which requires development.  Species, then, are those forms into which genus is divided without any single one being omitted; as if any one were to divide justice into law, custom, and equity.  A person who thinks that species are the same things as parts, is confounding the art; and being perplexed by some resemblance, he does not distinguish with sufficient acuteness what ought to be distinguished.  Often, also, both orators and poets define by metaphor, relying on some verbal resemblance, and indeed not without giving a certain degree of pleasure.  But I will not depart from your examples unless I am actually compelled to do so.