Therefore, as I said before, it will be always proper to take into consideration the character of that exception which is added to the original proposition.  For it will at all times have this influence, that either the necessity must be explained with reference to what is honourable, in this manner:—­“It is necessary, if we wish to live with honour;” or with reference to safety, in this manner:—­“It is necessary, if we wish to be safe;” or with reference to convenience, in this manner:—­“It is necessary, if we are desirous to live without annoyance.”

LVIII.  And the greatest necessity of all appears to be that which arises from what is honourable; the next to it is that which arises from considerations of safety; the third and least important is that which has ideas of convenience involved in it.  But this last can never be put in comparison with the two former.  But it is often indispensable to compare these together; so that although honour is more precious than safety, there is still room to deliberate which one is to consult in the greatest degree.  And as to this point, it appears possible to give a settled rule which may be of lasting application.  For in whatever circumstances it can happen by any possibility that while we are consulting our safety, that slight diminution of honesty which is caused by our conduct may be hereafter repaired by virtue and industry, then it seems proper to have a regard for our safety.  But when that does not appear possible, then we must think of nothing but what is honourable.  And so in a case of that sort when we appear to be consulting our safety, we shall be able to say with truth that we are also keeping our eyes fixed on what is honourable, since without safety we can never attain to that end.  And in these circumstances it will be desirable to yield to another, or to put oneself in another’s place, or to keep quiet at present and wait for another opportunity.  But when we are considering convenience, it is necessary to consider this point also,—­whether the cause, as far as it has reference to usefulness, appears of sufficient importance to justify us in taking anything from splendour or honour.  And while speaking on this topic, that appears to me to be the main thing, that we should inquire what that is which, whether we are desirous of obtaining or avoiding it, is something necessary; that is to say, what is the character of the addition; in order that, according as the matter is found to be, so we may exert ourselves, and consider the most important circumstances as being also the most necessary.

Affection is a certain way of looking at circumstances either with reference to the time, or to the result, or management of affairs, or to the desires of men, so that they no longer appear to be such as they were considered previously, or as they are generally in the habit of being considered.  “It appears a base thing to go over to the enemy; but not with the view which Ulysses had when he went over.