to do service to any one for the sake of the person himself to whom one is attached, combined with a corresponding inclination on his part towards oneself.  At present, because we are speaking of civil causes, we add the consideration of advantage to friendship, so that it appears a thing to be sought for the sake of the advantage also:  wishing to prevent those men from blaming us who think that we are including every kind of friendship in our definition.

But although there are some people who think that friendship is only to be desired on account of the advantage to be derived from it; some think it is to be desired for itself alone; and some, that it is to be desired both for its own sake and for the sake of the advantage to be derived from it.  And which of these statements is the most true, there will be another time for considering.  At present it may be laid down, as far as the orator is concerned, that friendship is a thing to be desired on both accounts.  But the consideration of the different kinds of friendship, (since they are partly formed on religious considerations, and partly not; and because some friendships are old, and some new; and because some originated in kindness shown by our friends to us, and some in kindness shown by ourselves to them; and because some are more advantageous, and others less,) must have reference partly to the dignity of the causes in which it originates, partly to the occasion when it arises, and also to the services done, the religious motives entertained, and its antiquity.

LVI.  But the advantages consist either in the thing itself, or in extraneous circumstances; of which, however, by far the greater portion is referable to personal advantage; as there are some things in the republic which, so to say, refer to the person of the state,—­as lands, harbours, money, fleets, sailors, soldiery, allies; by all which things states preserve their safety and their liberty.  There are other things also which make a thing more noble looking, and which still are less necessary; as the splendid decorating and enlarging of a city, or an extraordinary amount of wealth, or a great number of friendships and alliances.  And the effect of all these things is not merely to make states safe and free from injury, but also noble and powerful.  So that there appears to be two divisions of usefulness,—­safety and power.  Safety is the secure and unimpaired preservation of a sound state.  Power is a possession of things suitable to preserving what is one’s own, and to acquiring what belongs to another.  And in all those things which have been already mentioned, it is proper to consider what is difficult to be done, and what can be done with ease.  We call that a thing easy to be done, which can be done without great labour, or expense, or annoyance, or perhaps without any labour, expense, or annoyance at all, and in the shortest possible time.  But that we call difficult to be done which, although it requires labour, expense, trouble and time, and has every possible characteristic of difficulty about it, or, at all events, the most numerous and most important ones, still, when these difficulties are encountered, can be completed and brought to an end.